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I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to an estimate by the Institute of Medicine made over a 
decade ago, treatment errors in hospitals alone caused as many as 98,000 
deaths yearly.1  This Institute of Medicine report is proving to be very 
conservative.  A recent Consumer Reports investigation came to the 
conclusion that “[m]ore than 2.25 million Americans will probably die from 
medical harm this decade . . . .  ‘That’s like wiping out the entire populations 
of North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  It’s a man-made disaster.’”2  
Thus, it appears that the three major systems in the United States designed to 
improve the quality of patient care—the state medical malpractice and 
licensure systems and the private hospital peer review hearing system—are 
all failing at their task. 
To date, most of the attention of academics, legislators, and lawyers has 
been on critiquing the medical malpractice and licensure systems, while the 
far more important hospital peer review hearing system has gone almost 
unnoticed.  In light of the astonishing number of patients killed in hospitals 
each year and the soaring costs of healthcare, it is time to begin a critical 
review of the hospital peer review hearing system. 
Private hospital peer review is “a self-policing system where physicians 
 1.  INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. 
Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 2.  How Safe Is Your Hospital?  Our New Ratings Find That Some Are Riskier than Others, 
CONSUMER REPS. (Aug. 2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/08/how-safe-is-
your-hospital/index.htm. 
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informally evaluate each other and sanction those physicians who are 
allegedly failing to provide quality patient care.”3  This system is based on 
the old, and now discredited, “bad apples” approach to quality improvement 
that is grounded in the view that medical errors were caused by incompetent 
physicians.  This approach is sometimes referred to as the “name, blame, 
shame” model.4  A large body of research demonstrates that, in fact, most 
medical errors are not the result of incompetent physicians but instead are 
due to the faulty systems that the hospitals are relying upon to provide care.  
According to the Institute of Medicine, “improving safety for patients 
require[s] a systems approach in order to modify the conditions that 
contribute to errors.”5  Reflecting this understanding, modern empirically 
driven error prevention measures rely on a systems approach developed 
using the same continuous quality improvement theory relied upon in the 
airline industry.6 
Moreover, the “bad apples” approach used by the hospital peer review 
hearing process fosters an environment of secrecy about errors, undermining 
efforts to discover and fix the root causes of the errors.7  As the systems that 
hospitals do implement to avoid errors are only as good as the data they are 
based upon, faulty or insufficient data means faulty or insufficient systems.  
It is important to note that the threat of becoming the target of hospital peer 
review is a far greater deterrent to disclosure of medical errors than the 
threat of being sued for malpractice.  As many physicians have medical 
malpractice insurance, a physician can recover from the payment of damages 
pursuant to a lawsuit and can continue to practice medicine.  On the other 
hand, as this Article will explain, the possibility that a physician’s career can 
be completely destroyed by hospital peer review is very real.8  Thus, the 
“bad apples” approach is ill-conceived as it not only fails to deal with the 
main cause of medical errors, it also works to perpetuate the root causes of 
those errors by discouraging disclosure. 
Compounding the problem associated with the overall structure of the 
hospital peer review hearing process are the standards relied upon during the 
 3.  Katharine Van Tassel, Harmonizing the ACA with State Tort and Licensure Systems and 
Hospital Peer Review, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 3, 2012), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/03/harmonizing-the-aca-with-state-tort-and-licensure-systems-
and-hospital-peer-review/ [hereinafter Van Tassel, ACA]; see generally Katharine Van Tassel, 
Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving from Tort Doctrine to Contract 
Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179 (2006) [hereinafter 
Van Tassel, Due Process]. 
 4.  See infra notes 127–37 and accompanying text. 
 5.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 49. 
 6.  See id. at 71–73. 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  See infra notes 143–51. 
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process to measure physician competency.9  There are two main categories 
of standards that hospitals use to measure quality of care during the hearing 
process: customary care standards and standards that place complete 
discretion in the hands of hospital administrators to sanction a physician for 
the good of the hospital.  Both of these standards can have a negative impact 
on healthcare quality, cost, and access. 
The customary care, or eminence-based, category of standards for 
measuring physician competence is based upon treatment choices that are 
subjective and are based upon the predilections of particular physicians 
based upon tradition, opinion, or clinical experience.10  This choice is not 
being made based upon objective, scientific evidence.  This reliance in peer 
review on customary care standards is in direct contrast with the new 
national push to move the United States to a modern, evidence-based model 
of medical practice through major changes in government-provided 
healthcare, including the care provided under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act11 (ACA, also known as ObamaCare), Medicare, and 
Medicaid.12 The evidence-based model for making treatment choices is 
grounded in empirical data generated by clinical outcomes and effectiveness 
research that suggests the optimum treatment for a rapidly growing number 
of clinical conditions.  This use of empirical data generated through 
scientific methodology to make medical decisions shows great promise for 
enhancing quality of care while decreasing the cost of care.  This Article 
asserts that the hospital peer review hearing process encourages the 
perpetuation of custom-based practices through the use of customary care 
standards, undermining the national efforts to improve the quality and cost 
of healthcare through the practice of evidence-based treatment choices. 
The second category of standards, those that place complete discretion 
in the hands of hospital administrators to sanction a physician for the good 
of the hospital, contain no limit on the discretion of decision-makers.  These 
standards create a significant risk that decisions to exclude certain 
physicians could be made based on reasons having nothing to do with the 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 11.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
 12.  Katharine Van Tassel, Harmonizing the Affordable Care Act of 2010 with the Three Main 
National Systems for Healthcare Quality Improvement: The State Tort and Licensure Systems and 
the Hospital Peer Review System, 72 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150825 [hereinafter Van Tassel, Harmonizing]. 
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interests of patient safety.  These reasons could be economic, personal, or 
discriminatory in nature.  Importantly, there is a growing concern that peer 
review is being used to silence whistleblowers who are trying to call 
attention to poor quality of care or risky practices that could cause patient 
harm. 
Finally, there is the very real possibility that the “bad apples” approach 
relied upon in the hospital peer review hearing process adversely impacts 
access to healthcare, with a particularly negative potential impact on 
minority physicians and minority and low-income patients.13 
Together, these problems mean that the hospital peer review hearing 
process can actually act to negatively impact healthcare quality, cost, and 
access.  In light of the serious due process violations inherent in the 
processes adopted by most hospitals,14 these processes should be revamped 
to comport with the current scientific understanding of medical error 
prevention and quality improvement methodology, while at the same time 
protecting the due process rights of physicians and the rights of patients to 
access to healthcare. 
This Article starts with a history of the growth of hospital peer review 
and then examines the merits of the rationales that motivated the passage of 
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 198615 (“HCQIA”), which 
catapulted peer review into the national system that exists today.16  The 
Article next explains how the peer review hearing process works and how 
HCQIA turns private hospitals into small, individual quasi-regulatory 
agencies.  The Article goes on to critique the “bad apples” approach taken 
by hospital peer review in light of the growing body of empirical research 
that supports a systems improvement approach to dealing with the problem 
of medical error.17  Next, the Article explains how the choice of standards 
that hospital peer review relies upon to measure physician competence 
negatively impacts quality and cost.18  Finally, the Article raises questions 
regarding the possible impact that hospital peer review has on access to 
healthcare, with a particularly negative potential impact on minority 
physicians as well as minority and low-income patients.19 
This Article proposes that hospital peer review be completely 
 13.  See infra Part V. 
 14.  For a complete discussion see Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of 
the Federal System for Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data 
Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031 (2012) [hereinafter Van Tassel, Blacklisted]. 
 15.  Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2006)). 
 16.  See infra Part II. 
 17.  See infra Part III. 
 18.  See infra Part IV. 
 19.  See infra Part V. 
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restructured to comport with the current scientific understandings of the 
methodologies that best act to prevent medical errors.20  A new system 
should be developed that relies on the application of a blend of knowledge 
translation theory with continuous quality improvement research to integrate 
evidence-based treatment choices using clinical practice guidelines into 
physician practice.  Based on the libertarian paternalism theory developed by 
Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, this proposed system relies 
upon “gold standard” clinical practice guidelines as the default treatment 
choice, but then allows for individual physician choice in deviating from this 
choice if it is reasonable to do so.  This exception allows for the currently 
high level of scientific uncertainty that exists when it comes to many 
medical conditions, particularly in the realm of the treatment of outliers.  As 
the practice of evidence-based medicine (population-based medicine, or the 
treatment of “norm”) grows through the greater understanding of optimal 
treatment choices for the majority of people, and later transitions to 
personalized medicine based on the treatment of individuals according to 
their unique genetic profiles, this currently high degree of scientific 
uncertainly will steadily diminish over the next several decades, reducing the 
use of this exception.  This proposed system also looks to the future of 
medicine as it allows for, and facilitates, the ultimate transition of the 
practice of medicine to the personalized medicine model. 
In order to optimize this systems approach to error prevention, this new 
proposed system should be coupled with the adoption of a version of the 
anonymous third-party error reporting system successfully utilized by the 
airline industry that has been long advocated by the healthcare quality 
improvement movement. 
Finally, this proposal recognizes that the hospital is both the best and 
least cost avoider when it comes to medical errors by allowing physicians to 
use a comparative negligence type of defense during the peer review hearing 
process.  The use of this defense, coupled with reporting to an anonymous 
third-party error reporting system, acts to conditionally insulate the 
physician from National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) reporting. 
 20.  See infra Part VI. 
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II.  THE HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW HEARING PROCESS 
A.  The Rationales for the Passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement 
Act 
Hospital peer review is a private process whereby physicians evaluate 
each other’s performance and sanction those who are found to have provided 
poor patient care.21  Prior to 1986, hospital peer review was a process that 
only some hospitals utilized on a relatively infrequent basis to sanction 
physicians who allegedly provided poor quality patient care.22  Then, the 
1980s brought what many thought was a crisis in the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance.23  At the time, insurance costs were rising at rates that 
were causing some physicians to abandon their practices, while insurance 
companies were walking away from some markets.  Stories from the press 
about this perceived crisis abounded.24 
The usual suspects, the tort system and lawyers, were blamed.  President 
Ronald Regan and Attorney General Edwin Meese agreed with this 
assessment and touted tort reform as the answer to the problem.25  Others 
asserted that the answer was to encourage the adoption by hospitals of the 
use of the peer review process to weed out the “bad apples.”26  The latter 
viewpoint resulted in the passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement 
Act of 1986.27  HCQIA gave a congressional stamp of approval to the peer 
review hearing process by granting conditional immunity from suit for those 
involved in the process.28  Thereafter, the rate of adoption of peer review 
processes by hospitals across the country increased dramatically.  Today, 
every hospital in the country has some form of peer review hearing process 
in place. 
The following sections discuss the merits of the three problems that 
motivated the passage of HCQIA.  The three alleged problems were: (1) the 
threat of lawsuits allegedly discouraging physicians from participating in 
peer review; (2) the large number of incompetent physicians allegedly 
moving from state to state to avoid being barred from the practice of 
medicine; and, (3) the alleged crisis over the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance coverage. 
 21.  Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1186–89. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of 
Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L. J. 1495, 1496–98 (1988). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See infra notes 125–53 and accompanying text. 
 27.  S. 1744, 99th Cong., 100 Stat. 3743 (1986). 
 28.  Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1194–97. 
02 VAN TASSEL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:25 PM 
[Vol. 40: 911, 2013] Curing the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System  
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
919 
1.  Did the Threat of Lawsuits Chill Physician Participation in Peer 
Review? 
For many, the cause of the mythical malpractice insurance crisis of the 
1980s was simple: there were too many “bad doctors.”29  Those who held 
this belief argued for mechanisms to purge the system of incompetent 
physicians.30  Based on this belief, in the early to mid-1980s: 
[S]tates and health care accrediting bodies stepped up their 
promotion of peer review—the process by which physicians judge 
the competence of their fellow professionals and recommend 
disciplinary action for those found dangerously incompetent.  As 
this process gathered force, physicians aggrieved by the results of 
peer review increasingly appeared in federal court claiming that the 
actions of their peers were anti-competitive and violated federal 
antitrust laws.  Although hospitals and peer review participants 
generally prevailed in these lawsuits, the victories entailed costly 
and time-consuming litigation.31 
One of the narratives that added fuel to the fire was the case of Dr. 
Timothy Patrick, a matter that went all the way to the United States Supreme 
Court in Patrick v. Burget.32  The Patrick case involved a physician, Dr. 
Timothy Patrick, who started his career at the Astoria Medical Clinic 
(“Astoria Clinic”).  The Astoria Clinic was located in the town of Astoria, 
Oregon, population 10,000.33  During the relevant time period, Columbia 
Memorial Hospital (“CMH”) was the only hospital in town and a majority of 
the physicians at the CMH were either employees or partners of the Astoria 
Clinic.34 
 29.  Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6385 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1] (“This bill is 
needed to deal with one important aspect of the medical malpractice problem in this country—
incompetent and unprofessional physicians.”). 
 30.  Id. (“This legislation would do much to reduce the damage committed by this small, but very 
destructive, group of doctors.  It would require organizations that discipline doctors to report their 
disciplinary actions to a central location and would require hospitals to seek this information before 
hiring doctors.  It would also require the reporting and dissemination of paid malpractice claims.”). 
 31.  Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1037 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 32.  486 U.S. 94 (1988). 
 33.  Id. at 95–96. 
 34.  Id. at 96. 
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After working at the Astoria Clinic for one year, Dr. Patrick decided not 
to stay on as a partner.35  He began his own general surgery practice36 in 
competition with the Astoria Clinic.37 
After he left their practice, the physicians at the Astoria Clinic filed two 
separate complaints at separate times against Dr. Patrick with the executive 
committee of the only local hospital, CMH, alleging poor patient care.38  In 
both matters, the hospital began the hospital peer review hearing process 
allowing members of the Astoria Clinic to be involved in both the 
investigation and decision-making process.39  The first complaint was 
eventually dismissed.40 
At the private hospital hearing on the second complaint, the same 
Astoria Clinic partner who filed the first complaint sat as the chair of the 
five member ad hoc committee that heard the charges and defense.41  Rather 
than risk termination, Dr. Patrick resigned his staff privileges before the 
committee reached its decision.42 
Dr. Patrick filed suit alleging that the Astoria Clinic’s physicians 
violated antitrust laws by bringing a sham hospital peer review proceeding in 
order to destroy his practice and eliminate him as a competitor.43  The jury 
agreed, awarding him $650,000 in antitrust damages that the district court 
trebled to $2.2 million under the antitrust laws.  In addition, the court 
awarded $228,600 in attorney’s fees.44  Importantly, on appeal, the Ninth 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 96–97.  As the relationship soured, the Astoria Clinic doctors began to criticize Dr. 
Patrick for failing to obtain adequate backup coverage and outside consultations for his patients 
admitted to the hospital.  Id.  Then, in 1979, Dr. Boelling, a partner in the Astoria Clinic, filed the 
first complaint against Dr. Patrick with the executive committee of CMH’s medical staff.  Id.  
According to Dr. Boelling, Dr. Patrick had allegedly left a patient in the care of a new associate.  Id.  
The new associate left the patient unattended.  Id. 
 39.  Id.  The person who chaired the investigation of this first complaint was a partner in the 
Astoria Clinic, Dr. Russell.  Id.  As a result of the investigation, the complaint was referred to the 
State Board of Medical Examiners (BOME) by the executive committee.  Id. at 97.  In addition, 
other cases of Dr. Patrick’s were referred to the BOME.  Id.  The same Dr. Russell, who chaired the 
investigation at the hospital, drafted the letter of reprimand that was issued by the BOME.  Id.  This 
letter was eventually withdrawn.  Id.  Then, only two years later, another Astoria Clinic partner filed 
a second complaint against Dr. Patrick with CMH.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id.  Dr. Patrick attempted to get the members of the ad hoc committee to testify about their 
personal bias against him, but they refused.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 98.  Two of the defendants in the case were partners in the Astoria Clinic, Dr. Gary 
Boelling and Dr. Franklin Russell.  Another defendant was a surgeon working at the Astoria Clinic, 
Dr. Richard Harris. 
 44.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit later reversed, finding that the trial court did not properly instruct the 
jury on the state-created antitrust immunity to peer review activities.  See id.  Ultimately, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Oregon’s peer 
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Circuit Court of Appeals made the specific finding that “there was 
substantial evidence that respondents had acted in bad faith in the peer-
review process.”45 
The press, and later Congress, appeared to ignore the important sham 
peer review aspects of the case.46  Instead, the sensationalized press spin that 
caught national attention was that an incompetent physician was allowed to 
opt-out of a peer review proceeding to avoid a decision on his competence.47  
Then, that same incompetent physician turned around and filed a lawsuit and 
won millions against the honest, hard-working members of the peer review 
committee who were just trying, altruistically, to improve the quality of 
patient care.48 
Adding to the hype, it was claimed that the Patrick case was causing 
alarm among physicians because it raised the specter of retaliatory litigation 
for good faith involvement in peer review.49  Members of Congress 
speculated, with no empirical evidence in support, that this alleged 
apprehension discouraged doctors from volunteering to be a part of the peer 
review process in order to steer clear of the possibility of facing a court case 
that could cost millions.50  To lessen these unconfirmed fears, Congressman 
Ron Wyden of Oregon (Dr. Patrick’s home state where the case was 
litigated) played good politics by introducing a bill to provide immunity 
from lawsuits filed by targeted physicians against those who engaged in 
“good faith” peer review.51  This bill later became HCQIA.52  Thus, it 
review statute did not provide for active supervision as necessary to establish antitrust immunity 
under the state-action doctrine.  Id. at 98–99, 105. 
 45.  Id. at 98 (footnote omitted). 
 46.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically found that: 
 [T]here was substantial evidence that respondents had acted in bad faith in the peer-
review process.  The court held, however, that even if respondents had used the peer-
review process to disadvantage a competitor rather than to improve patient care, their 
conduct in the peer-review proceedings was immune from antitrust scrutiny.  The court 
reasoned that the peer-review activities of physicians in Oregon fall within the state-
action exemption from antitrust liability because Oregon has articulated a policy in favor 
of peer review and actively supervises the peer-review process. 
Id. at 98–99 (footnotes omitted). 
 47.  See Nicholas Kadar, How Courts Are Protecting Unjustified Peer Review Actions Against 
Physicians by Hospitals, 16 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 17, 20 (2011). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 20; see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6384. 
 50.  Kadar, supra note 47, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3. 
 51.  Kadar, supra note 47, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 3. 
 52.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 1. 
02 VAN TASSEL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:25 PM 
 
922 
appears that there was little real evidentiary support for the proposition that 
the threat of lawsuits was chilling participation in peer review and that 
HCQIA was needed to deal with this problem. 
2.  Were Large Numbers of Incompetent Physicians “State Hopping” to 
Avoid Sanctions? 
While the sensationalized and highly slanted version of the Patrick case 
played out in the national press, another, more gruesome narrative captured 
the attention of the nation.  The story of Dr. Frederick Huffnagle hit the 
pages of the Boston Globe in 1986,53 chronicling how the doctor was able to 
move his medical practice from state to state, leaving a series of horribly 
mangled patients in his wake. 
After performing unauthorized experimental replacement hip surgery in 
one hospital in Connecticut,54 Dr. Huffnagle moved to another hospital that 
was not aware of his malpractice in the same state.55  There, he implanted in 
a patient an artificial knee that was the wrong size.56  When he removed it, 
he fractured one of the patient’s bones and ruptured a tendon, leaving the 
patient permanently disabled.57  Altogether, Dr. Huffnagle was successfully 
sued five times for malpractice that occurred in Connecticut.58  In 1981, Dr. 
Huffnagle moved to California and obtained staff privileges at a hospital by 
lying about his past malpractice cases.59  In the one year he practiced in 
California, four more malpractice lawsuits were filed against him.60  Dr. 
 53.  Small Percentage of Doctors Responsible for Surge in Malpractice Suits, Rates, BOS. 
GLOBE, June 15, 1986, at M1. 
 54.  Id.  Within two years of obtaining staff privileges at Beverly Hospital in Danvers, 
Connecticut, Dr. Huffnagle was placed on probation for performing experimental hip replacement 
surgery without the proper equipment in 1970.  Id.  Dr. Huffnagle had never performed the surgery 
before, nor had anyone else at the hospital where the surgery was performed.  Id.  Due to this 
incident, among “other serious continuing difficulties,” Beverly Hospital declined to renew his staff 
privileges.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  Dr. Huffnagle also had staff privileges at nearby Hunt Memorial.  Id.  In spite of the 
problems at Beverly Hospital, Dr. Huffnagle continued to perform surgeries at Hunt Memorial, 
including several surgeries on Beatrice Higgins.  Id.  Although she had osteoarthritis, Beatrice could 
still walk to the grocery store to get her groceries when she first met Dr. Huffnagle.  Id.  The good 
doctor implanted an artificial knee in Beatrice which was the wrong size.  Id.  When he removed it, 
he fractured a bone and ruptured a tendon.  Id.  Five years later, Beatrice was still confined to a 
nursing home and could only leave in a wheelchair.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  One of those patients, twenty-nine-year-old Roger Lucas, was a bindery supervisor who 
pulled a muscle in his back when stacking crates.  Id.  Four years after a botched surgery by Dr. 
Huffnagle, Roger Lucas was left seriously disabled and in constant pain.  Id.  According to the story, 
he was unable to ever work again.  Id. 
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Huffnagle next transferred to Massachusetts to yet another position treating 
patients.61 
Along with the Patrick and Huffnagle cases, the perceived medical 
malpractice insurance crisis was utilized by the press to inflame the public, 
giving Congress the incentive to adopt the Health Care Quality Improvement 
Act of 1986.62  It appears that emotion ruled the day, prompting action 
without any follow-up research into whether the Patrick and Huffnagle cases 
were representative of a large number of other, similar, situations.  HCQIA’s 
legislative history describes the sentiment of the times: 
 Unfortunately, groups such as state licensing boards, hospitals 
and medical societies that should be weeding out incompetent or 
unprofessional doctors often do not do so.  Even when such bodies 
do act against bad physicians, these physicians find it easy to move 
to different hospitals or states and continue their practices in these 
new locations. 
 The result has been a series of highly visible situations in which 
physicians with a long history of incompetence or unprofessional 
conduct have continued to cause needless deaths and injury for 
years after their damaging behavior was noticed.63 
In the findings of the Act itself, Congress explained the purposes behind 
the legislation: 
The Congress finds the following: 
 (1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the 
need to improve the quality of medical care have become 
nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can 
be undertaken by any individual State.64 
As discussed in the next section, there was, and still is, a quality of care 
crisis in the form of preventable medical errors that kill tens of thousands of 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2006)). 
 63.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384. 
 64.  42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2006).  For a more complete discussion of HCQIA see Van Tassel, 
Due Process, supra note 3, at 1194–97. 
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people in hospitals every year.65  Therefore, this finding is supported by 
empirical evidence.66  However, the other findings appear to be based on 
mere speculation.  For example, the next congressional finding that 
supported the passage of HCQIA was that “[t]here is a national need to 
restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State 
without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s previous damaging or 
incompetent performance. . . .  This nationwide problem can be remedied 
through effective professional peer review.”67 
A search of the legislative record reveals that no studies were cited to 
support this conclusion.  Research also indicates that the problem of 
physicians “state hopping” after injuring patients in one state to start practice 
with a clean slate in another state was not common.68 
The last congressional finding in support of the peer review section of 
HCQIA is also suspect: “The threat of private money damage liability under 
Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, 
unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective 
professional peer review. . . .  There is an overriding national need to 
provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective 
professional peer review.”69 
There is no evidence cited in the legislative record that physicians were 
chilled from reporting their inept colleagues or were discouraged from 
participating in peer review by the threat of suit.  To the contrary, the more 
likely cause of any reluctance on the part of physicians to report their 
colleagues to hospital administration is the culture prevalent in most 
hospitals.70 
In order to ameliorate this speculative problem of a reluctance to 
participate in peer review, provisions were written into HCQIA to broadly 
insulate peer review participants, including hospitals, from liability in 
 65.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 66.  See infra notes 80–86. 
 67.  42 U.S.C. § 11101(2)–(3). 
 68.  Charlotte L. Rosenberg, How Bad Doctors Dodge Discipline, 62 MED. ECON. 241, 241–54 
(1985) (reporting on thirty-three physicians who engaged in state hopping after negative state 
licensure proceedings and pointing out that less than 1% of physicians have problems that lead to 
licensure sanctions); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-84-53, REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: EXPANDED FEDERAL AUTHORITY NEEDED TO 
PROTECT MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PATIENTS FROM HEALTH PRACTITIONERS WHO LOSE THEIR 
LICENSES, at iii (1984) (identifying thirty-nine doctors who relocated to new states after losing their 
license in another state). 
 69.  42 U.S.C. § 11101(4)–(5). 
 70.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA 
BANK: MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK’S RELIABILITY 7 (2000), 
available at www.gao.gov/assets/240/230998.pdf [hereinafter MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE 
NEEDED]. 
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monetary damage.71  The goal was to prevent physicians from challenging 
the results of peer review in court and winning damages, like the case of Dr. 
Patrick.72  HCQIA also established the National Practitioner Data Bank, 
discussed in Part II.C of this Article, in order to prevent physicians like Dr. 
Huffnagle from “mov[ing] from State to State without disclosure or 
discovery of the physician’s damaging or incompetent performance.”73 
As described in Part III, this early day “bad apples” approach has proven 
to have negative effects on the quality of care movement, and, on the federal 
level, has been replaced by a systems approach that uses continuous quality 
improvement theory.74 
3.  Was There a Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis? 
The reality is that there was not a crisis in medical malpractice 
insurance during the 1980s, as Professor Thomas Baker points out in his 
popular and highly regarded book The Medical Malpractice Myth.75  
Professor Baker persuasively debunks “the beliefs that undergird the call for 
tort ‘reform’ and impede the ability of the polity to focus on, and respond 
constructively to, the real problems of health care in twenty-first century 
America.”76  The insurance cycle was the real cause of the rise in insurance 
 71.  Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1194–97. 
 72.  This immunity does not extend to civil rights claims or government antitrust prosecutions.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-903, pt. 1, at 2–3 (1986) (“[I]t is essential to 
provide some legal immunity to doctors and hospitals that engage in peer review activities, as noted 
above, under current law and practice, physicians who engage in incompetent or unprofessional acts 
find it very convenient to move to another jurisdiction and resume practice. . . .  [F]aced with the 
certainty that they can no longer hide their past records, physicians facing disciplinary action will 
feel compelled to challenge vigorously any action taken against them.  Based on recent experience, 
the Committee believes that many of these physicians will file antitrust lawsuits.”).  It is important to 
note that at no point was the goal of HCQIA to bar the ability of physicians to challenge a sham peer 
review and gain injunctive relief from sham peer review sanctions unrelated to quality of care.  For 
this reason, the Act does not actually use the term “immunity.”  Instead, it provides that if a 
“professional review action” meets the Act’s standards, the peer reviewers “shall not be liable in 
damages under any law of the United States or of any State . . . with respect to the [professional 
review] action.”  42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1)(D). 
 73.  42 U.S.C. § 11101(1). 
 74.  See infra notes 125–53 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See generally TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005) [hereinafter BAKER, 
MYTH]. 
 76.  Mary Coombs, The Medical Malpractice Myth, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 243, 243 (2006) 
(reviewing TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005)). 
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rates in the 1980s.77  Moreover, there was no real relationship between “bad” 
doctors and the perceived insurance crisis.78 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that there was, and still is, a 
medical malpractice crisis.79  Importantly, Professor Baker points out what 
many, until recently, have ignored—that an astonishing amount of 
malpractice occurs in the United States.80  In 1999, the Institute of Medicine 
issued the ground-breaking report on medical errors in hospitals called To 
Err Is Human.81  The nation was shocked to learn that between 44,000 and 
98,000 patients die each year in hospitals due to preventable medical 
mistakes.82  And then, in 2010, a follow-up study of ten North Carolina 
hospitals revealed that the hospital peer review processes institutionalized by 
HCQIA are ineffective, as “harms remain common, with little evidence of 
widespread improvement.”83 
The problem of medical error prompted Consumer Reports to issue the 
first-ever safety ratings of hospitals in July of 2012.84  According to the 
Consumer Reports investigation, medical errors 
contribute to the deaths of 180,000 hospital patients a year, 
according to projections based on a 2010 report by the Department 
of Health and Human Services.  Another 1.4 million are seriously 
 77.  Id.; see also Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005) [hereinafter Baker, Cycle] (providing a primer on the liability insurance 
underwriting cycle that draws on the research prompted by the mid-1980s insurance hard market). 
 78.  Id. at 393. 
 79.  Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from 
Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2130 (2010) (“In a study of 10 North Carolina 
hospitals, we found that harm resulting from medical care was common, with little evidence that the 
rate of harm had decreased substantially over a 6-year period ending in December 2007.”). 
 80.  BAKER, MYTH, supra note 75, at 24.  For example, the California Medical Insurance 
Feasibility Study was the first major study that came out in the mid-1970s.  See Don Harper Mills, 
Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary, 128 W.J. MED. 360 (1978).  This study 
discovered that one out of every twenty patients was injured by physicians and one out of every ten 
of these patients died as a result.  See id. at 363–64.  Of these injuries, one out of every six was the 
result of malpractice.  See id. at 363–65.  This translated into physicians injuring 140,000 patients 
and killing 14,000 patients in California in 1974 alone.  See id.  Then, there was the famous Harvard 
Medical Practice Study that came out in the mid-1980s during the second medical malpractice 
insurance “crisis.”  See T.A. Brennan, Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized 
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 13 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 145 
(2004).  This study was commissioned and paid for by the State of New York and was performed by 
researchers from Harvard.  Id.  The Harvard Medical Practice Study rocked the country when it 
published its findings that doctors injured one out of twenty-five patients and one out of every four 
of these cases was caused by negligence.  Id.  There were 27,000 injuries from medical malpractice 
in New York in 1984.  Id. at 29.  This study suggests that there are 140,000 patients who die from 
medical malpractice every year.  Id. at 30.  
 81.  See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 1. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Landrigan et al., supra note 79, at 2124. 
 84.  CONSUMER REPS., supra note 2. 
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hurt by their hospital care.  And those figures apply only to 
Medicare patients.  What happens to other people is less clear 
because most hospital errors go unreported and hospitals report on 
only a fraction of things that can go wrong.85 
The Consumer Reports article goes on to point out that “[m]ore than 
2.25 million Americans will probably die from medical harm this decade . . . 
.  ‘That’s like wiping out the entire populations of North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont.  It’s a man-made disaster.’”86   
The question then becomes how to deal with the problem of medical 
error?  Are these failures of human beings or of systems?87 
This medical malpractice crisis means that hospital peer review is 
actually a good idea.  However, as discussed below,88 the dated “bad apples” 
approach of the current peer review system, which has been discredited by 
empirical research, must be replaced with a modern peer review system.  
Updating the peer review system can be accomplished using knowledge 
translation theory to implement a systems approach for avoiding medical 
error using continuous quality improvement methodology grounded in 
empirical outcomes research.89 
B.  How Does the Hospital Peer Review Hearing Process Work? 
Private peer review “is a self-policing system [conducted in hospitals] 
where physicians informally evaluate each other and sanction those 
physicians who are allegedly failing to provide quality patient care.”90  This 
commonly triggers an investigation and, if the targeted physician contests 
the results of the investigation, she or he can request a hearing.91  The 
hearing is a highly informal affair conducted by the hospital with the 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  What has gone unnoticed is that there are relatively few medical malpractice lawsuits, 
especially compared to the amount of medical malpractice.  BAKER, MYTH, supra note 75, at 25–26.  
For every one medical malpractice lawsuit, there are between seven and twenty-five injuries.  
Compare this with car accident cases: almost everyone who gets injured by a negligent driver files 
an auto lawsuit or claim.  See id. 
 88.  See infra notes 125–53 and accompanying text. 
 89.  See Part VI.B. 
 90.  Van Tassel, ACA, supra note 3; see also DEBORA A. SLEE, VERGIL N. SLEE & H. JOACHIM 
SCHMIDT, SLEE’S HEALTH CARE TERMS 439 (5th ed. 2008). 
 91.  See Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1191–92. 
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physician permitted to engage in very limited discovery.92  If a physician is 
found to have provided poor quality of care after a hearing conducted by the 
hospital,93 that physician may be penalized in a variety of ways.  The 
ultimate sanction is the termination of the physician’s hospital staff 
privileges.94  The investigation and hearing are conducted pursuant to the 
process described in the institution’s medical staff bylaws.95  While hospitals 
differ in the exact processes they adopt, most have a few common features.  
First, medical staff bylaws are viewed as enforceable contracts between the 
hospital and members of the medical staff.96  These bylaws outline who can 
make a complaint.97  The medical staff executive committee usually decides, 
based on the complaint, whether an investigation should be initiated or 
whether the matter should be dropped98—unless there is an emergency, in 
which case the chief of staff decides.99 
If a decision is made to investigate a complaint, as a general rule, the 
physician will be notified.100  Either the executive committee will conduct 
the investigation itself, or they will appoint an ad hoc committee made up of 
members of the general medical staff to do so.101  Beyond the possibility of 
 92.  AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK: CREDENTIALING AND PEER 
REVIEW PRACTICE GROUP OF THE AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 60 (3d ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK]. 
 93.  Hospital peer review is conducted pursuant to the obligations of the hospital medical staff to 
ensure “the quality of the professional services provided by individuals with clinical privileges . . . .”  
JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION 
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, ch. PMS.1, at MS-2 (1999 ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter CAMH]. 
 94. See PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 92; see CAMH, supra note 93, at MS-7. 
 95.  For a detailed explanation of this process, see Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 
1194–97. 
 96.  See MICHAEL A. CASSIDY, IMMUNITY FOR CREDENTIALING DECISIONS UNDER FEDERAL 
AND STATE LAW 38 (2003). 
 97.  Also called a request for corrective action.  See PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 92, at 
30.  The bylaws also describe the person who, or group that, decides whether to commence an 
investigation based on the complaint.  Id. at 23. 
 98.  In Pulido v. St. Joseph Memorial Hospital, 547 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), the court 
granted summary judgment against a physician who pointed out that the same four-member 
executive committee conducted the investigation and found that summary suspension of staff 
privileges was warranted.  The Illinois Court of Appeal also heard the appeal of their own decision, 
which they affirmed.  Id. at 1387–88.  The hospital board of trustees then affirmed.  Id. 
 99.  Id.  When the situation poses “immediate danger” to patients warranting immediate 
summary suspension of the physician’s staff privileges, one individual can be designated as the 
decision-maker—commonly the chief of staff—or the decision can be made by the executive 
committee.  Id. 
 100.  The Peer Review Guidebook advocates giving the physician the full details of the complaint.  
PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 92, at 23.  See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 
N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn. 1977) (physician notified of investigation).  It is not always the case that 
physicians are given notice that an investigation is being undertaken.  See Islami v. Covenant Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (physician was not informed of investigation). 
 101.  Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1189–94. 
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being interviewed, which may or may not happen, the physician has no role 
in the investigation phase.102 
Once the investigation is complete, the next step depends on whether the 
medical executive committee or an ad hoc committee of the medical staff 
has conducted the investigation.103  If the investigation has been undertaken 
by an ad hoc committee, that committee will draft the set of charges and 
make recommendations for corrective action.  The recommended corrective 
action of the ad hoc committee will be sent to the targeted physician, who 
can file an appeal with the executive committee.  The executive committee 
will have a summary, highly informal “hearing” in order to reach a 
decision.104  This decision can then be appealed to the board of directors.105  
However, the board of directors is commonly comprised of laypersons who 
are likely to concur with the medical judgments of the medical executive 
committee.106  As mentioned previously, in 1986 Congress passed HCQIA, 
giving a congressional stamp of approval to the hospital peer review process 
by providing conditional immunity from suit to those who participate in the 
process.107 
C.  The National Practitioner Data Bank Reporting and Query Mandates 
In addition to creating “immunity” from suit, HCQIA also set up the 
National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”).108  Under the Act and its 
regulations, multiple different organizations are required to report 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  If the medical staff executive committee has conducted the investigation, it will draw up 
the list of charges and its recommended corrective action.  Id.  This judgment can then be appealed 
by the physician to the governing body of the hospital.  Id.  The appeal is not de novo but is based on 
the record created by the hearing in front of the executive committee.  PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, 
supra note 92, at 28.  After a highly informal “hearing” on the matter, the decision of the board of 
directors then constitutes a final action of the hospital that the physician can appeal to a trial court.  
Id. at 28. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See John H. Colteaux, Note, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STAN. L. 
REV. 900, 907 (1965). 
 107.  See Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1194–97. 
 108.  See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2006).  The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
has the federal responsibility of oversight for the NPDB.  MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED, 
supra note 70, at 7.  HRSA completed the regulations that established the operation of the NPDB in 
October of 1989.  Id.  While HRSA is responsible for ensuring compliance with these regulations, a 
private operator performs the actual day-to-day operation of the NPDB.  Id. 
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information that allegedly reflects poor quality patient care by physicians.109  
For example, insurance companies must report malpractice payments and 
settlements on behalf of physicians to the NPDB.110  State licensing boards 
must report disciplinary actions111 and health care providers112 must report 
peer review actions that restrict a physician’s clinical privileges for more 
than thirty days.113 
Hospitals must also check the NPDB every two years on every 
physician who already has staff privileges and for each physician applying 
for staff privileges.114  Organizations such as professional societies and state 
licensure boards are allowed to query the NPDB, but they are not required to 
do so.115  Individual physicians may only query for information about 
themselves.116 
1.  Recent Expansion to Include All Healthcare Practitioners in the 
NPDB Reporting System 
In 2010, the passage of new regulations expanded the list of healthcare 
professionals that the NPDB reports on from only physicians and dentists to 
all healthcare practitioners.117  In addition, the list of entities that can query 
the NPDB has expanded to include “private sector hospitals, nursing homes, 
and other organizations so that they may be used when making employment, 
affiliation, certification, or licensure decisions.”118 
 109.  MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED, supra note 70, at 7. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.  For example, hospitals and health plans.  Id. 
 113.  Id.  Even private professional societies such as the American Dental Association and the 
American Medical Association must report sanctions that impact membership.  Id.  Some federal 
agencies, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs, must report to the NPDB any negative actions 
involving physicians they insure, employ, or regulate.  Id. at 8.  Practitioners excluded from 
participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs must also be reported if they either default on 
federal loan agreements or engage in fraud or abuse.  Id. at 8–9. 
 114.  Id. at 9. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  HHS National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other 
Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. pt. 60, §§ 60.1–60.16 (2012). 
 118. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/section1921.jsp (last visited Aug. 11, 2011).  Thus: 
 Hospitals and their human resource departments and nurse recruitment offices now 
have access to licensure actions on all types of health care professionals.  They may 
query the Data Bank on all types of health care professionals including nurses, nurse 
aides, and other allied health care professionals when making their hiring decisions.  The 
ability to perform pre-employment screenings of potential health care employees is an 
invaluable resource that can enhance the hiring process and increase an organization’s 
efforts towards patient safety. 
Id. 
02 VAN TASSEL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:25 PM 
[Vol. 40: 911, 2013] Curing the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System  
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
931 
These new regulations bring the states into the picture by requiring 
hospitals to send reports of all action “that adversely affects the clinical 
privileges of a physician [or dentist] for a period longer than 30 days”119 to 
the state licensure board.  The state licensure boards are then required to 
report this information to the NPDB.120 
As more fully discussed below,121 the fact that hospitals must check the 
NPDB for negative reports before granting staff privileges to a physician122 
means that a negative NPDB report can mean the end of a physician’s 
career.123  This is because it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to find a 
new position after a negative NPDB report.124 
III.  THE MERITS OF THE “REMOVING BAD APPLES” APPROACH USED BY 
PEER REVIEW VERSUS THE CONTINUOUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 
APPROACH OF THE NATIONAL PATIENT SAFETY MOVEMENT FOR DEALING 
WITH MEDICAL ERRORS 
Previously, the assumption was that the majority of medical errors were 
caused by incompetent or lazy physicians.125  The hospital peer review 
system is based on this “bad apples” approach, which posits that the quality 
of healthcare can be improved by identifying the “bad apples” and removing 
them from the system.126  This is called the “name, blame, shame” model.127  
One of the important goals of the national patient safety movement is to 
teach providers about the substantial flaws in this “bad apples” approach.128 
 119.  42 U.S.C. § 11133 (2006). 
 120.  See HHS National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other 
Health Care Practitioners: Reporting on Adverse and Negative Actions, 45 C.F.R. pt. 60, § 60.5(d) 
(2012). 
 121.  See infra notes 143–51 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (2006). 
 123.  See Van Tassel, Blacklisted, supra note 14, at 2057–62. 
 124.  See infra notes 143–51 and accompanying text; see also Sheree Lynn McCall, A Hospital’s 
Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 175 
(1980) (“A physician’s livelihood is dependent on acquiring and maintaining hospital staff 
privileges.”). 
 125.  See Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care, 320 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 53 (1989). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  David C. Hsia, Medicare Quality Improvement: Bad Apples or Bad Systems?, 289 JAMA 
354 (2003). 
 128.  Kelly Fryer-Edwards, Talking about Harmful Medical Errors with Patients, TOUGH TALK: 
HELPING DOCTORS APPROACH DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS, http://depts.washington.edu/toolbox/ 
errors.html (last visited July 10, 2012). 
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Based on lessons drawn from other high-risk industries such as aviation 
and nuclear power, the Institute of Medicine instructs that the broad and 
diverse nature of medical errors means that the “bad apples” approach was 
ill-conceived; rather, it is the health care systems themselves that must be 
changed.129  The report emphasizes that “although some of these cases [of 
preventable adverse events] may stem from incompetent or impaired 
providers, the committee believes that many could likely have been avoided 
had better systems of care been in place.”130 
In the time since the Institute of Medicine report was issued, patient 
safety experts have come to agree with the Institute of Medicine that the 
majority of medical errors are not the result of incompetent physicians but 
are due to faulty systems that hospitals are relying upon to provide care.131 
Health care delivery for any one patient involves a variety of 
complex interlinked systems.  Different individual providers and 
teams of providers are often involved in the care of a single patient; 
those providers are governed by interwoven regulations emanating 
from provider groups, facilities, states and the federal government.  
Factors at every level of these systems affect the incidence of 
medical errors and the responses that they provoke.  From this 
perspective, it is clear that preventing errors does not entail simply 
“getting rid of bad apples.”  Rather, “improving safety for patients 
require[s] a systems approach in order to modify the conditions that 
contribute to errors.”  After reviewing the successful systems-based 
safety improvements in the airline industry and in workplace safety, 
the IOM noted, “[A]ccidents can be prevented through good 
organizational design and management.”132 
The patient safety movement not only asserts that the “bad apples” 
approach is not the solution to the problem of medical errors, but also that 
the “bad apples” approach actually has a negative impact on the quality of 
healthcare since it promotes secrecy about errors.133  It is human nature to 
avoid disclosure of mistakes if it means not only the potential loss of 
hospital staff privileges, but also the real possibility of the loss of a 
physician’s entire career practicing medicine.134  As discussed in the next 
 129.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 30. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Feature, A National Survey of Medical Error Reporting Laws, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 202 (2009) (the editorial staff of the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics 
conducted a national survey of medical error reporting laws). 
 132.  Id. at 203 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 133.  See id. at 213. 
 134.  For a complete discussion see Van Tassel, Blacklisted, supra note 14, at 2057–62. 
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section, this can be the result of many hospital peer review proceedings.135  
The Institute of Medicine acknowledged that many, if not most, physicians 
were likely to be hesitant to report their own mistakes and those of others.136  
Underreporting was already recognized as a serious problem at the time of 
the Institute of Medicine report.137 
A.  Underreporting Negatively Impacts the Identification of the Root Causes 
of Medical Errors 
Underreporting is a serious hurdle that must be overcome before the 
problem of medical error can be remedied.  This is because health care 
administrators and policymakers need accurate data on the different types of 
errors and how often they occur in order to diagnose the root causes of 
medical errors.138  Once the causes of the errors are identified, system 
reforms can be implemented.139 
As such, the secrecy surrounding errors prevents proper analysis of the 
root causes of errors and inhibits efforts to prevent recurrences of those 
errors.140  The systems that hospitals implement to avoid errors are only as 
good as the data they are based upon.  Faulty or insufficient data means 
faulty or insufficient systems.  Thus, the “bad apples” approach is ill-
conceived as it not only fails to deal with the main cause of medical errors, it 
also works to perpetuate the root causes of those errors by discouraging 
disclosure.  More open communication among healthcare workers about 
errors, as well as decreasing the “culture of blame” in healthcare around 
errors, are both seen as prerequisites to understanding why errors really 
happen and how they can be prevented.141 
B.  A Negative Peer Review Report Can Be a “Career-Ender,” Chilling 
Error Reporting 
The patient safety movement has identified the fear of lawsuits as one of 
the causes of medical error underreporting.142  What is missing from the 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See A National Survey of Medical Error Reporting Laws, supra note 131, at 213. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See id. at 203. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See id. at 213–14. 
 141.  Id. at 213. 
 142.  See id. at 218. 
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literature is the fact that hospital peer review is likely to be a far more 
muscular deterrent of error reporting as it involves the exponentially greater 
sanction of the loss of the ability to practice medicine entirely.  For example, 
for a surgeon, the loss of hospital staff privileges in one hospital as the result 
of a negative peer review report can mean the end of that physician’s 
career.143  For a surgeon, lack of access to hospital facilities to perform 
surgeries is, in effect, the end of that physician’s practice.144  The most 
obvious situation where this will occur is when there is only one hospital 
facility in the community.145  Loss of clinical privileges at that sole hospital 
means being barred from the practice of medicine in that community.146 
 143.  See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 378 (5th 
ed. 2001) (explaining that a precondition to the practice of medicine is access to hospitals); see also 
McCall, supra note 124, at 175 (“A physician’s livelihood is dependent on acquiring and 
maintaining hospital staff privileges.  This access to hospital facilities is necessary for most 
physicians to adequately treat and care for patients, to maintain their medical practice, and to pursue 
their medical career.”); Note, The Physician’s Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-
Private Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 485, 510–11 (asserting that a successful doctor must have 
access to hospitals). 
 144.  See McCall, supra note 124, at 175; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 143, at 378 
(explaining that precondition to the practice of medicine is access to hospitals). 
 145.  Kiracofe v. Reid Mem’l Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that 
when a hospital is the only one in a community, “its economic impact is great, and the denial of 
hospital privileges, in many cases, is tantamount to denying a physician the opportunity to practice 
his or her chosen profession”).  In Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824–25 (N.J. 1963), 
the court described the situation as follows: 
 The Newcomb Hospital is the only hospital in the Vineland metropolitan area and it is 
publicly dedicated, primarily to the care of the sick and injured of Vineland and its 
vicinity . . . .  Doctors need hospital facilities and a physician practicing in the 
metropolitan Vineland area will understandably seek them at the Newcomb Hospital.  
Furthermore, every patient of his will want the Newcomb Hospital facilities to be readily 
available.  It hardly suffices to say that the patient could enter the hospital under the care 
of a member of the existing staff, for his personal physician would have no opportunity of 
participating in his treatment; nor does it suffice to say that there are other hospitals 
outside the metropolitan Vineland area, for they may be too distant or unsuitable to his 
needs and desires.  All this indicates very pointedly that, while the managing officials 
may have discretionary powers in the selection of the medical staff, those powers are 
deeply imbedded in public aspects, and are rightly viewed, for policy reasons . . . as 
fiduciary powers to be exercised reasonably and for the public good. 
Id. at 824. 
 146.  See Kiracofe, 461 N.E.2d at 1142; see also Greisman, 192 A.2d at 824–25.  What many 
seem to lose sight of is that a physician’s inability to practice has a ripple effect—when a physician 
can no longer practice medicine, all of that physician’s patients lose access to healthcare.  This 
situation could impact hundreds of people.  The loss of their physician is especially hard on those 
who are dependent on Medicaid and Medicare; it could be years before they are able to find a new 
physician willing to take on new Medicaid or Medicare patients.  One in three physicians are 
currently turning away new Medicaid patients.  See Robert Lowes, Almost 1 in 3 Physicians Turn 
Away New Medicaid Patients, MEDSCAPE TODAY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/76876.  This situation will grow exponentially worse as the 
physician shortage grows and millions of new ACA patients and aging baby boomers flood the 
system.  See id. 
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While taking a bit more time to occur, an adverse peer review finding 
will ultimately impact the physician who practices in a very large 
community with multiple hospitals in the same disastrous way.  When the 
hospital does its mandatory check of the NPDB for physicians applying for 
staff privileges for the first time, or the once-every-two-year check for 
physicians already on staff, the negative report will become known.147  A 
termination or limitation of staff privileges at one hospital is likely to trigger 
a second hospital to follow suit to avoid placing itself at risk of being sued 
for negligent credentialing.148  A national survey revealed that in 2007 alone, 
48,075 licensure, credentialing, or memberships decisions were impacted by 
NPDB reports.149 
Dr. Edward Dench, Jr., former president of the Pennsylvania Medical 
Society, opines that a data bank report “‘can essentially make you 
unemployable, and it can be the difference between getting insurance and 
 147.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 148.  In a GAO report on the problems with the accuracy of the data contained in the NPDB, the 
agency acknowledged that the information contained in the databank “can affect a practitioner’s 
reputation and livelihood . . . .”  MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED, supra note 70, at 3.  An 
HRSA survey revealed that NPDB users, including credentialing committees, chiefs of the medical 
staff, department chairs, and the chief executive officers, found the reports to be an important part of 
the credentialing process.  See Teresa M. Waters et al., The Role of the National Practitioner Data 
Bank in the Credentialing Process, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 30, 34 (2006). 
 149.  ALAN LEVINE ET AL., STATE MEDICAL BOARDS FAIL TO DISCIPLINE DOCTORS WITH 
HOSPITAL ACTIONS AGAINST THEM, 6 & n.7 (2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/1937.pdf.  The Levin report reached this conclusion based upon 
data from TERESA M. WATERS ET AL., INST. FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH & POL’Y STUDIES, 
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK USER AND NON-USER SURVEYS: FINAL REPORT, tbl. 
IV.C.94.  Levin, et al., supra.  The authors of the Levin report explained that they reached this 
conclusion based on Waters’s “survey question which was ‘Would your decision regarding the 
practitioner have been different if you had not received the NPBD response?’  9.04% of the 
responses answered ‘yes.’  Applying this percentage to the 531, 802 matches for 2007 results in an 
estimated 48,075 decisions that were affected by an NPBD report.”  Id.  Adding to the cascade of 
negative effects a physician faces from a negative peer review report is the loss of both medical 
insurance and the termination of managed care contracts.  See generally McCall, supra note 124.  In 
most states, a physician cannot practice without liability insurance.  And the loss of managed care 
contracts alone can destroy a physician’s practice, even without all of the other negative 
consequences of being blacklisted.  See id.  The amazing growth of managed care compels the 
participation of almost all health care providers in managed care contracts.  See id.  Physicians who 
are not part of a practice group with managed care contracts, or who are not preferred providers with 
multiple managed care organizations, have a difficult time maintaining a practice.  See id.  In order 
to be considered for, or maintain, these contracts, health care providers must work to stay in good 
standing with these managed care organizations.  See id.  Physicians who lose hospital staff 
privileges for quality of care reasons are highly likely to face the immediate termination of managed 
care contracts.  See id. 
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not getting insurance . . . .’”150  A far-reaching and comprehensive study 
commissioned by the State of California into the reasons for the low and 
declining level of reporting of negative peer review actions to the NPDB 
supports Dr. Dench by revealing that: 
[P]hysicians who have been the subject of a [negative peer review 
action] report state that it is difficult or impossible to find a new 
position, their professional lives are ruined, other entities will not 
grant privileges even if they have fulfilled the terms of the 
discipline, and they spend years and hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in court trying to clear their professional names and 
reputations. 
 . . . . 
 . . .  Physicians who had experienced [having a negative peer 
review report state that it] . . . was a “career ender.”151 
Thus, like the tort and licensure systems, the threat of a hospital peer 
review action provides a powerful disincentive to error reporting.  Arguably, 
the hospital peer review system, with its career-ending potential, is an even 
greater obstacle. 
C.  Error Reporting Statutes Provide Confidentiality from Disclosure in 
Civil Lawsuits, But Not in Private Peer Review Actions 
Of the twenty-seven states that have implemented mandatory medical 
error reporting systems, twenty-one have express provisions that bar the 
production of the error reports in any civil litigation in order to encourage 
error reporting.152  However, none of these states protect the physician who 
has reported his or her own error from being targeted by the hospital peer 
review process.153  As many physicians have medical malpractice insurance, 
 150.  Steve Twedt, A Negative Data Bank Listing Isn’t Easy to Erase, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (October 27, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/us/a-negative-
data-bank-listing-isnt-easy-to-erase-520674/. 
 151.  LUMETRA, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF PEER REVIEW IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT, 65, 94 
(2008), available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/publications/peer_review.html (Physicians with 
negative peer review reports “described not being able to find any position or job after having an 
[negative] report filed and spending three to five years in [peer review] hearings and other 
procedures to fight for their reputations, even after the [licensure board] found no wrongdoing on 
their part.  They reported spending thousands of dollars to fight the charges so they could again 
practice as physicians.”). 
 152.  Id. at 214. 
 153.  Id. at app., available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/publications/peer_review.html (the appendix 
sets forth the language of the statutes in place in each state; a review of this language reveals no 
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a physician can recover from payment of damages pursuant to a lawsuit and 
can continue to practice medicine.  As such, the loss of a medical 
malpractice lawsuit is less threatening than the loss of a physician’s entire 
career that can occur from a negative hospital peer review proceeding.  This 
creates the possibility that the threat of hospital peer review discourages 
error reporting and nullifies any positive effect of provisions that bar 
production of error reports in civil litigation. 
IV.  DOES THE HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW HEARING SYSTEM NEGATIVELY 
IMPACT QUALITY OF CARE? 
There are two main categories of standards that hospitals rely upon in 
peer review to measure quality of care: customary care standards and 
standards that place complete discretion in the hands of hospital 
administrators to sanction a physician for the good of the hospital.  As 
discussed in the next sections, both sets of standards can have a negative 
impact on the quality and cost of healthcare. 
A.  The Impact of Customary Care Standards on Healthcare Quality and 
Cost 
Unfortunately, one of the two main standards that hospital peer review 
relies upon to measure physician competence consists of the same customary 
care standards that many state tort systems are starting to walk away from 
based on concerns about their negative impact on quality of care.154  
Examples of the standards that fall into this category of customary care 
include those which hold physicians to a standard of care as measured by the 
“[hospital’s] standard of competence”155 or “the general standards of the 
surgical community”156 or the “standard of the hospital or the medical staff . 
mention of private hospital peer review actions). 
 154.  See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the 
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 170 (2000) (explaining that many states are moving 
away from custom as the exclusive proxy for quality). 
 155.  Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill. 1989) (physician’s 
treatment of patients failed to conform to “the Center’s standard of competence”). 
 156.  Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246, 248–49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  In 
Rhee, a newly minted surgeon who had excellent credentials and training evaluations during his 
residency ran afoul of a group of surgeons in the hospital where he started his practice.  Id.  
Members of this group of physicians both served on the peer review panels charged with judging 
whether the new surgeon met this in-house standard and testified that the new surgeon “did not 
‘meet the general standards of the surgical community at El Camino Hospital . . . .’”  Id. at 248–49. 
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. . .”157  As is the case with the use of customary care standards in medical 
malpractice litigation, the reliance in peer review on customary care acts to 
entrench custom-based decision making at the cost of quality of care.158 
As a general matter, “customary care” is the type of care that is typically 
given by other physicians under comparable circumstances.  Customary care 
is subjective and is based on the predilections of particular physicians based 
upon tradition, opinion, or clinical experience159 and not on objective, 
scientific evidence.  The practice of providing customary care, also referred 
to by many as “eminence-based medicine,”160 is the normative practice in the 
United States. 
In comparison, the evidence-based model of medical practice is centered 
on empirical data created by comparative effectiveness research and 
outcomes analysis.  As this body of research grows, evidence-based 
treatment guidelines are being developed using this empirical data.  These 
evidence-based practice guidelines, called clinical practice guidelines 
(“CPGs”), can be used to recommend optimal treatments for a steadily 
increasing number of clinical disorders. 161  CPGs reflect the “well-
considered opinions of expert panels, based upon reviews of the best 
available data, as to how physicians should approach certain clinical 
problems.”162  
1.  The Four Different Categories of Customary Care Practice 
The customary care model of medical practice is currently the dominant 
model for the provision of healthcare in the United States.  Unfortunately, a 
steadily growing group of studies demonstrate that many customary 
treatment choices can have a negative impact on the quality and cost of 
 157.  Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581, app., at 588 (Minn. 1977) (describing the 
bylaws which state that corrective action is appropriate when “professional conduct of any member 
of the staff shall be considered to be lower than the standard of the hospital or the medical 
staff . . . .”); see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 242, at 633 (1st ed. 2000). 
 158.  See infra notes 235–43 and accompanying text. 
 159.  IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH & EVALUATION, EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICES: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 
AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~iowapic/files/EBP%20Guide%20-
%20Revised%205-03.pdf (The Iowa Consortium for Substance Abuse Research and Evaluation is 
based at the University of Iowa). 
 160.  A term first used by David Eddy.  See David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified 
Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9, 9 (2005). 
 161.  CPGs are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions 
about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”  INST. OF MED., CLINICAL 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 (Marilyn Field & Kathleen N. Lohr 
eds., 1990). 
 162.  Richard R. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for 
Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (1989). 
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healthcare.  These problems with the customary care model of medical 
practice have, over time, become well-documented by the Dartmouth Atlas 
Project.163  Research conducted under the auspices of the Dartmouth Atlas 
Project 164 “uses very large claims databases from the Medicare program and 
other sources to define where Americans seek care, what kind of care they 
receive, and to determine whether increasing investments in health care 
resources and their use result in better health outcomes for Americans.”165   In 
a special report issued by the Dartmouth Atlas Project, three different 
categories of customary care practices were identified that can have a 
significant, negative impact on healthcare quality and cost: failure to provide 
necessary care, preference-sensitive care, and supply-sensitive care.166  This 
Article also adds an additional category—misuse of medical care.  
These four categories of customary care practices, and their impact on 
healthcare quality and cost, are explained in the next subsections.  The first 
category of customary care practices are those that give rise to the misuse of 
care.  Examples of these customary care practices are provided in Section 
IV.A.1.a.  The second category of customary care is described by the 
Dartmouth Atlas Project as the failure to provide needed care;167 in other 
words, care for which the benefits clearly outweigh the risks.168  This Article 
 163.   Understanding the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care System, DARTMOUTH 
ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  The 
Dartmouth Atlas describes itself as follows: 
For more than 20 years, the Dartmouth Atlas Project has documented glaring variations 
in how medical resources are distributed and used in the United States. The project uses 
Medicare data to provide information and analysis about national, regional, and local 
markets, as well as hospitals and their affiliated physicians. This research has helped 
policymakers, the media, health care analysts and others improve their understanding of 
our health care system and forms the foundation for many of the ongoing efforts to 
improve health and health systems across America. 
Id. 
 164.  The Dartmouth Atlas Project is a “product of the Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences 
at Dartmouth Medical School.”  Press Release, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, New Study 
Shows Need for a Major Overhaul of How United States Manages Chronic Illness (May 16, 2006), 
available at http://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/news/2006_h1/16may2006_overhaul.shtml [hereinafter 
Dartmouth Press Release]. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  ELLIOT S. FISHER, DAVID C. GOODMAN & AMITABH CHANDRA, REGIONAL AND RACIAL 
VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A BRIEF REPORT OF THE 
DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT 24 (Kristen K. Bronner ed., 2008), available at 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/AF4Q_disparities_Dec2008.pdf. 
 167.  Id.  The Dartmouth Atlas Project describes effective care as “consist[ing] of evidence-based 
services such as Hemoglobin A1c testing for diabetics” and further states that “[v]ariations in 
effective care reflect failure to deliver needed care.”  Id. 
 168.  Minal S. Kale et al., Trends in the Overuse of Ambulatory Health Care Services in the 
United States, 173 JAMA: INTERNAL MED. 142, 142–43 (2013) (“. . . underuse represents the failure 
02 VAN TASSEL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:25 PM 
 
940 
refers to failure to provide needed, or necessary care as the underuse of care.  
While misuse is the incorrect choice of medical care and so is an error of 
commission, underuse is an error of omission.  Examples of customary care 
practices that can result in the underuse of care are provided in Section 
IV.A.1.b.  
The third category of customary care is preference-sensitive care.  The 
Dartmouth Atlas Project explains that preference-sensitive care occurs when 
a condition has multiple possible treatment options, each with its own 
benefits and risks. 169  The Dartmouth Atlas Project has, in great detail, 
described the broad geographical variations in the provision of the type and 
invasiveness of care that has arisen in the use of preference-sensitive 
customary care.  This Article refers to these broad geographical variations in 
the delivery of care as the unwarranted variation in care.  Examples of this 
type of care are set forth in Section IV.A.1.c.  
The fourth category of customary care is supply-sensitive care.  The 
Dartmouth Atlas Project describes supply-sensitive care as care for which 
the supply of a specific resource (for example, number of physicians, 
hospital beds or specialized testing equipment) heavily influences the 
customary amount of care provided.170  With supply-sensitive care, the 
amount of spending on the same condition can vary widely depending on 
where the patient lives.171  This Article refers to supply-sensitive customary 
care as the overuse of medical care.  Examples of these broad variations in 
the use of medical care are discussed in Section IV.A.1.d.     
a.  Customary Care Can Be Poor Quality Care—Misuse 
Public health research into comparative effectiveness has revealed that 
customary care can actually be “bad” patient care.  Customary care choices 
can lead to both misuse and underuse of healthcare.  The delivery of the 
wrong care is the misuse of care.  The failure to deliver necessary healthcare 
is the underuse of care—in other words, care for which the benefits of the 
treatment clearly outweigh the potential risks associated with that 
treatment.172    
With regard to misuse, scientific studies have identified numerous 
customary care practices that show little to no evidence of benefit, but which 
can actually put patients in danger of harm, that are still practiced on a daily 
to deliver healthcare for which the benefits outweigh the risks (e.g. use of an aspirin in patients with 
coronary disease); and misuse is the delivery of the wrong care (e.g. the use of an antibiotic other 
than nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole or quinolone is the incorrect treatment for 
uncomplicated urinary tract infections).”). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 142–43. 
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basis.  This problem with the integration of evidence-based treatment 
choices into physician practice is a well-studied problem.  Scores of studies 
have revealed that physicians are being exposed to evidence-based medicine 
in the form of CPGs on a regular basis—they go to seminars, listen, agree, 
then go back to practice and ignore the new information.173  In an initiative 
to change entrenched medical practices, seventeen major medical specialty 
groups issued recommendations that physicians stop using ninety different 
unnecessary, but frequently used, tests and procedures, many of which are 
harmful to patients.174  
This list of “don’ts” adds to a prior list of forty-five previous 
recommendations made in “an educational initiative called Choosing 
Wisely, directed at both patients and physicians, under the auspices of the 
American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation and in partnership with 
Consumer Reports.”175  Examples of a few of the many practice customs that 
 173.  See e.g., Lee A. Green et al., Translation of Research into Practice: Why We Can’t “Just Do 
It,” 18 J. AM. BRD. FAMILY PRAC. 541, 541(2005) (There is “widespread agreement that physicians 
and healthcare systems simply do not put new knowledge about how to improve our patients’ 
outcomes into practice nearly quickly enough. . . .  For example, consider the guideline that 
“congestive heart failure patients should be evaluated for use of beta-blockers.”  An expert physician 
may be aware of this recommendation and may wholeheartedly accept it as good practice, but may 
still fail to adopt it when they happen to see an elderly patient in the clinic who could benefit from 
beta-blockage.  Knowledge of evidence can remain separate from, and not integrated into, the 
physician’s extensive database of procedures that guides their decision and actions.  This makes the 
likelihood of recognizing that the new knowledge is appropriate and incorporating it into these well-
rehearsed procedures very uncertain.”); Illaria Baiardini et al., Why Do Doctors and Patients Not 
Follow Guidelines?, 9 CURRENT OPINION ALLERGY CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 228, 228 (2009) 
(“During the last few years, different studies and theories have tried to explain the reason why 
doctors and patients do not follow guidelines. . . .  [A]lthough the efforts to develop and divulge 
evidenced-based guidelines, results of studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands 
suggest that most of the time, guidelines are not applied; about 30-40% of patients do not benefit 
from a cure programme based on scientific evidence, whereas 20-25% of therapeutic choices may be 
unnecessary and sometimes even harmful.”); Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians 
Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines?, 282 JAMA 1458, 1458 (1999) (“Despite wide promulgation, 
clinical practice guidelines have had limited effect on changing physician behavior.”); Justin Timbie 
et al., Five Reasons That Many Comparative Effectiveness Studies Fail to Change Patient Care and 
Clinical Practice, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2168, 2168 (2012) (“[D]ecades of experience suggest that 
translating evidence into changes in clinical practice is rarely rapid . . . .”); David A. Davis et al., 
Translating Guidelines Into Practice: A Systematic Review of Theoretic Concepts, Practical 
Experience and Research Evidence in the Adopting of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 15 CAN. MED. 
ASS’N J. 408, 408 (1997) (“The evidence shows serious deficiencies in the adoption of CPGs in 
practice”). 
 174.  Laurie Tarkan, Doctor Groups Issue Lists of Overused Medical Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 
2013, 12:52 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/doctor-groups-issue-list-of-overused-
medical-tests/. 
 175.  Roni Caryn Rabin, Doctor Panels Urge Fewer Routine Tests, N.Y. TIMES (April 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/health/doctor-panels-urge-fewer-routine-tests.html?_r=0: 
United States specialty societies representing more than 500,000 physicians developed 
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involve the misuse of care that are on the Choosing Wisely list of “don’ts” 
follow.  
The Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging recommends 
against the use of routine annual stress testing using a nuclear heart scan 
after coronary artery surgery as this exposes a patient to a level of radiation 
that is the equivalent of 2,000 chest x-rays.176  The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists recommends against the induction of labor 
or the performance of a C-section as a matter of convenience before a 
woman’s 39th week of pregnancy, unless it is medically necessary, as it can 
lead to an increased risk of learning disabilities, respiratory problems and 
other risks to the baby.177  The American Academy of Neurology 
recommends against the prescription of opioid or butalbital drugs to treat 
migraine headaches, except when no other treatment is effective, as frequent 
use of these drugs can worsen migraines.178  The Society of Hospital 
Medicine—Pediatric Hospital Medicine recommends against the routine use 
of anti-reflux treatment for infants who suffer from acid reflux as this 
treatment can cause significant adverse effects.179  The American Geriatrics 
Society recommends against the prescription of benzodiazepines or other 
sedative hypnotics in older adults as a first choice for insomnia, agitation, or 
delirium because the use of these medications doubles the risk of car 
accidents, falls and hip fractures in older adults.180 
lists of Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question in recognition of the 
importance of physician and patient conversations to improve care and eliminate 
unnecessary tests and procedures.  These lists represent specific, evidence-based 
recommendations physicians and patients should discuss to help make wise decisions 
about the most appropriate care based on their individual situation.  Each list provides 
information on when tests and procedures may be appropriate, as well as the 
methodology used in its creation. 
 In collaboration with the societies, Consumer Reports has created resources for 
consumers and physicians to engage in these important conversations about the overuse 
of medical tests and procedures that provide little benefit and in some cases harm. 
Lists, CHOOSING WISELY: AN INITIATIVE OF THE ABIM FOUNDATION, 
http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/ (last visited on Mar. 16, 2013). 
 176.  SOC’Y OF NUCLEAR MEDICINE & MOLECULAR IMAGING, Five Things Physicians and 
Patients Should Question, CHOOSING WISELY, http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-
lists/society-of-nuclear-medicine-and-molecular-imaging/ (last visited on Mar. 16, 2013). 
 177.  AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, Five Things Physicians and Patients 
Should Question, CHOOSING WISELY, http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/american-
college-of-obstetricians-and-gynecologists/ (last visited on Mar. 16, 2013). 
 178. AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question, 
CHOOSING WISELY, http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/american-academy-of-
neurology/ (last visited on Mar. 16, 2013). 
 179. SOC’Y OF HOSP. MED.—PEDIATRIC HOSP. MED., Five Things Physicians and Patients Should 
Question, CHOOSING WISELY, http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/society-of-
hospital-medicine-pediatric-hospital-medicine/ (last visited on Mar. 16, 2013). 
 180.  AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y, Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question, CHOOSING 
WISELY, http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/american-geriatrics-society/ (last visited 
on Mar. 16, 2013). 
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b.  Customary Care Can Be Poor Quality Care—Underuse 
A correspondingly large group of physicians adhere to customary 
practices of not providing critical treatments, even in the face of repeated, 
empirically sound studies that these treatments are of great benefit to their 
patients.  The failure to provide these treatments can, in many situations, 
expose patients to a significantly increased risk of death.  These customary 
care practices represent underuse of healthcare.181  A major 2012 study 
suggests that underuse continues to be a major problem in spite of efforts to 
integrate CPGs into daily physician practice.182  For example, physicians are 
failing to provide antithrombotic treatment for atrial fibrillation in 28.1% of 
these cases.183  Prescribing antithrombotic drugs decreases the risk of stroke 
for these patients.184  For patients with coronary heart disease, doctors are 
failing to provide aspirin 35.5% of the time, beta-blockers 44.8% of the 
time, and statins 41.4 % of the time.185  Aspirin can reduce the occurrence of 
vascular events, including myocardial infarction and death.186  Beta-blockers 
can decrease all cause and cardiovascular mortality, cardiovascular 
hospitalizations, and the need for revascularization procedures.187  Statins 
can reduce the risk of cardiovascular events.188  
Doctors also fail to prescribe beta-blockers in congestive heart failure 
patients 40.3% of the time189 (beta-blockers ameliorate symptoms and 
greatly improve mortality190) and fail to prescribe statins in diabetes patients 
 181.  Ashish K. Jha et al., Care in U.S. Hospitals—The Hospital Quality Alliance Program, 353 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 265, 265 (2005) (uncovering the unfortunate failure of both physicians and 
hospitals to provide treatments that were essential for saving the lives of those who suffered from the 
most common causes of death, pneumonia, heart attack, and heart failure). 
 182.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 142–43 (describing a study that suggests there has been little 
improvement on the part of individual physicians in this underuse problem in the seven years since 
the 2005 Jha study, supra note 181). 
 183.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 143. 
 184.  N. A. Mark Estes III et al., ACC/AHA/Physician Consortium 2008 Clinical Performance 
Measures for Adults with Nonvalvular Atrial Fibrillation or Atrial Flutter: A Report of the American 
College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Performance Measures and the 
Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement, 117 CIRCULATION 1101, 1104 (2008), 
available at http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/117/8/1101.full (“Atrial fibrillation is associated with 
an increased risk of stroke, heart failure, and all-cause mortality, especially in women.”). 
 185.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 143. 
 186.  AM. COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY ET AL., CHRONIC STABLE CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE: 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SET 55 (2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/pcpi/cadminisetjune06.pdf. 
 187.  Id. at 61. 
 188.  Id. at 29. 
 189.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 143. 
 190.  William E. Chavey, II, The Importance of Beta Blockers in the Treatment of Heart Failure, 
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63.8% of the time191 (statins can decrease cardio-vascular disease events by 
19% to 55%—a major cause of mortality in diabetes patients).192  Adding to 
this surprising picture, physicians fail to prescribe ACE inhibitors in 
congestive heart failure patients 58.4% of the time.  ACE inhibitors can, 
when prescribed in conjunction with standard treatment, slow heart failure 
progression in patients with mild symptoms, and can have a beneficial 
impact on mortality, morbidity, and quality of life.193  Finally, physicians are 
failing to prescribe antiplatelets for stroke patients 51.3% of the time (the 
use of antiplatelets can significantly decrease the risk of secondary stroke, 
myocardial infarction, and death194) and are failing to prescribe drugs for the 
treatment of osteoporosis 54.9 % of the time195 (the use of pharmacologic 
treatments can “prevent fractures in women and men with osteoporosis or 
low bone density”).196  
Also of great concern are the widespread flaws recently found in the 
treatment of ovarian cancer.197  A new study whose results were announced 
in March of 2013 focused on 13,321 women with ovarian cancer who were 
diagnosed from 1999 to 2006 in California.198  The study revealed that only 
37% of the women studied received the treatment recommended in CPGs 
promulgated by the National Comprehensive Cancer Network, a consortium 
of twenty-one major cancer treatment centers.199  This means that two-thirds 
of the physicians who treat ovarian cancer patients ignored CPGs that 
significantly impact mortality.200  
The number of studies that suggest that customary care can actually 
negatively impact quality of care by either suggesting that a physician 
62 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2453, 2453–62 (2000), available at 
http://www.aafp.org/afp/2000/1201/p2453.html. 
 191.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 143. 
 192.  John Buse, Statin Treatment in Diabetes Mellitus, 21 CLINICAL DIABETES 168 (2003) 
(“Since the 1970s, there have been substantial epidemiological data demonstrating that 
cardiovascular diseases (here defined as ischemic heart disease, stroke, and peripheral vascular 
disease) constitute the primary cause of morbidity and mortality in patients with diabetes.  In fact, at 
least 60% and arguably 80% of people with diabetes will eventually succumb to cardiovascular 
disease (CVD).”). 
 193.  M. K. Davies et al., ABC of Heart Failure: Management: Diuretics, ACE Inhibitors, and 
Nitrates, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 428, 429 (2000). 
 194.  Dawn Meyer, Antiplatelets and Stroke Outcomes: State of the Science, 21 CRITICAL CARE 
NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 517, 517–28 (2009). 
 195.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 143. 
 196.  Amir Qaseem et al., Pharmacologic Treatment of Low Bone Density or Osteoporosis to 
Prevent Fractures: A Clinical Practice Guideline from the American College of Physicians, 149 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 404, 405 (2008). 
 197.   Denise Grady, Widespread Flaws Found in Ovarian Cancer Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
11, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/health/ovarian-cancer-study-finds-
widespread-flaws-in-treatment.html?pagewanted=all. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
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provide the wrong treatment or fail to provide a life-saving treatment are 
steadily growing.  These studies demonstrate that following customary care 
may mean that a patient’s condition may not only fail to improve, it may 
worsen through their exposure to unnecessary risks of harm, including long-
term disability or death.    
c.  Customary Care Is Related More to Location Than to Quality—
Unwarranted Variation 
Through a long series of large empirical studies, the Dartmouth Atlas 
Project has documented that patients receive very different care depending 
on where they live—from region to region across the entire United States—
suggesting that customary care might have a stronger links to geography 
than quality.201  For example, a patient is five times more likely to undergo a 
lower extremity bypass if that patient lives in Baltimore, Maryland than if 
that patient lives in Temple, Texas.202  Another example deals with patients 
with prostate cancer.  It is three times more probable that a patient will 
undergo a radical prostatectomy if that patient lives in Salt Lake City than if 
that patient lives in San Francisco.203  
Leg amputation is an infrequent, but shattering, complication of diabetes 
and peripheral vascular disease.204  Depending where a patient with diabetes 
lives, that patient’s chances of leg amputation can change by a factor of ten 
times.205  
Other illustrations involve the rates of shoulder, hip, and knee 
replacements.  A person with chronic shoulder pain living in Provo, Utah is 
 201.  CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCI., DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE: STUDIES 
OF SURGICAL VARIATION SPINE SURGERY, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/ 
Spine_Surgery_2006.pdf (last updated Apr. 15, 2010).  For example, a patient is 20% more likely to 
have spine surgery if that patient lives in Idaho Falls, Missoula or Mason City than if that patient 
lives in Newark, Bangor or Terre Haute.  Id.  Other examples: a patient living in Bradenton, Florida 
has a 75% greater chance of spinal surgery than a patient living in its neighbor to the north, Tampa, 
Florida, id., and a patient is 50% more likely to have hip surgery if that patient lives in Ft. 
Lauderdale than in neighboring Miami.  ELLIOTT S. FISHER ET AL., TRENDS AND REGIONAL 
VARIATION IN HIP, KNEE, AND SHOULDER REPLACEMENT (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Joint_Replacement_0410.pdf. 
 202.  Anita Arora et al., What Kind of Physician Will You Be?  Variation in Health Care and Its 
Importance for Residency Training (Oct. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/pages/residency. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Philip P. Goodney et al., Variation in the Use of Lower Extremity Vascular Procedures for 
Critical Limb Ischemia, 5 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY OUTCOMES 94, 94 (2012), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3281555/. 
 205.  Id. at 10. 
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ten times more likely to undergo a shoulder replacement than someone 
living in Syracuse, New York.206  For a person with chronic hip pain, if that 
person lives in Ogden, Utah, that person is four times more likely to undergo 
a hip replacement than a person who lives in Bryan, Texas.207  
Correspondingly, a person with chronic knee pain living in Lincoln, 
Nebraska is almost four times more likely to undergo a knee replacement 
than a person living in Manhattan, New York.208  
In the context of chronically ill patients, another study demonstrated that 
the amount and type of care for those at the end of life varied a great deal 
between academic medical centers located in different regions across the 
country.209  The authors of the study explain that “[t]he degree of variation 
suggests . . . that patients are receiving care and resident physicians are 
receiving training that reflects the local practice style of their teaching 
hospital.”210 
Collectively, these studies suggest that customary care choices can be 
based on physician preferences (referred to in one major study as “local 
practice styles”211) unlinked from best practices and that these preferences 
are more influenced by the region in which a physician practices medicine 
than by quality of care.  
d.  Customary Care Can Be Costly Healthcare—Overuse  
Following customary care can also lead to the overuse of healthcare.  It 
is estimated that $700 billion is wasted every year by the United States 
healthcare system.  The overuse of healthcare “has been identified as a 
significant component [of this waste], equaling roughly 280 billion.”212  
Studies on the appropriateness of care suggest that “from one quarter to one 
third of medical services may be of no value to patients.”213  For example, 
7.0% of screening x-rays, 11.3% of screening EKGs, 25.3% of screening 
urine analyses, and 37.9% of complete blood counts are unnecessarily 
 206.  FISHER ET AL., supra note 201, at 6. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 8. 
 209.  Arora et al., supra note 202, at 7. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 143. 
 213.  Robert H. Brook & Kathleen N. Lohr, Will We Need to Ration Effective Medical Care?, 
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 1986, at 68.  Another study found a “seventeen-fold variation in lab use 
among internists dealing with clinical patients.”  Steven A. Schroeder et al., Use of Laboratory Tests 
and Pharmaceuticals: Variation Among Physicians and Effect of Cost Audit on Subsequent Use, 225 
JAMA 969 (1973) (There are wide variations in the use of “laboratory tests, prescription drugs, X-
rays, return appointments, and telephone consultations among similarly trained doctors in a wide 
variety of practice settings.”). 
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ordered as part of a general medical exam.214  The overuse of antibiotics is of 
particular concern in light of the rapidly growing number of antibiotic 
resistant infections in the United States.215  Antibiotics are unnecessarily 
prescribed for acute bronchitis 58.8% of the time, for upper respiratory tract 
infections 40.2% of the time, and for asthma 6.8% of the time.216  
Another example comes from a 2012 study completed by researchers at 
the Stanford University School of Medicine which revealed that an invasive 
heart test, used routinely to measure heart function, is being dramatically 
overused.217  This test is called a left ventriculography (or left 
ventriculogram) and it measures the amount of blood that gets squeezed out 
with each heartbeat.  This test costs $300.218  In 2007, 37,000 Aetna patients 
underwent this test.  Eighty-eight percent of these patients had already 
undergone another, more effective test that provided the equivalent (and in 
many cases, better) information to the physician.219  These patients should 
not have received this test as they were exposed to the risks associated with 
injecting the dye, such as increased radiation exposure and an increased risk 
of heart arrhythmias and stroke without any benefit,220 wasting $976,800 
every year. 
Studies performed under the auspices of the Dartmouth Atlas Project 
suggest that a significant portion of this overuse is because these are supply-
sensitive services.  The care of chronically ill, older adult patients is a good 
 214.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 146. 
 215.  Peter Eisler, Deadly ‘Superbugs’ Invade U.S. Health Care Facilities, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 
2013, 4:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/29/bacteria-deadly-hospital-
infection/1727667/ (finding that deadly CRE bacteria are showing up in hospitals and other health 
care facilities across the country and there is virtually nothing to stop these “superbugs” at this 
point); Antibiotics: Misuse Puts You and Others at Risk, MAYO CLINIC (Feb. 4, 2012), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/antibiotics/FL00075 (“Antibiotics can be lifesavers, but misuse 
has increased the number of drug-resistant germs.”). 
 216.  Kale et al., supra note 168, at 146. 
 217.  Ronald M. Witteles et al., Use and Overuse of Left Ventriculography, 163 AM. HEART J. 
617, 617–23 (2012). 
 218.  Invasive Heart Test Being Dramatically Overused, Study Shows, SCI. DAILY (April 6, 2012), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/04/120406234519.htm. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id.  In 2011, the National Physicians Alliance through its Good Stewardship project 
identified the top five overused ambulatory care practices in internal medicine, family medicine and 
pediatrics and then began a campaign to educate physicians in how to avoid these overuses.  Good 
Stewardship Working Grp., The “Top 5” Lists in Primary Care: Meeting the Responsibility of 
Professionalism, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1385, 1385–90 (2011).  The “Choosing Wisely” 
campaign was started the following year by the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation in 
coordination with nine physician specialty groups to identify tests or procedures that are commonly 
used but are not always appropriate.  CHOOSING WISELY: AN INITIATIVE OF THE ABIM 
FOUNDATION, http://choosingwisely.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
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example of how these supply-sensitive services can lead to overuse.221   
Common, customary belief is that: 
[M]ore services—that is, using every available resource such as 
specialists, hospital and ICU beds, diagnostic tests and imaging, and 
more—produces better outcomes.  Based on this assumption, the 
supply of resources—not the incidence of illness—drives utilization 
of the services.  In effect, the supply of hospital beds, ICU beds, and 
specialty physicians creates its own demand, so areas with more 
resources per capita have higher costs per capita.222 
A study investigating the amount of care provided to chronically ill, 
elderly patients in their last six months of life223 discredited the ‘more is 
better’ myth in healthcare as hospitals that provided more exhaustive care 
and spent more did not get better results.224  On the other hand, those “with 
 221.  Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 164 (summarizing the study findings that “[a]lmost 
One-Third of Medicare Spending for Chronically Ill Unnecessary, According to Dartmouth Atlas of 
Health Care; Improving Care Could Also Lower Costs” (referring to John E. Wennberg et al., The 
Care of Patients with Severe Chronic Illness: An Online Report on the Medicare Program by the 
Dartmouth Atlas Project (2006), available at 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf) and stating that 
this Dartmouth study “studied the records of 4.7 million Medicare enrollees who died from 2000 to 
2003 and had at least one of 12 chronic illnesses.  The study demonstrates that even within this 
limited patient population, Medicare could have realized substantial savings—$40 billion or nearly 
one-third of what it spent for their care over the four years—if all U.S. hospitals practiced at the 
high-quality/low-cost standard set by the Salt Lake City region.  The report comes on the heels of a 
report by Medicare’s trustees that the insurance program will exhaust its trust fund in 2018, two 
years earlier than previously forecast.”). 
 222.  Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 164 (“The financial incentives used by Medicare and 
most other payers encourage the overuse of acute care hospital services and the proliferation of 
medical specialists.  The care of people with chronic illness accounts for more than 75 percent of all 
U.S. health care expenditures, indicating that overuse and overspending is not just a Medicare 
problem—the health care system as a whole has not developed efficient, effective ways of caring for 
people with severe chronic illnesses.”). 
 223.  This study reviewed data from the top academic medical centers in the country and 
discovered that: 
[T]he average number of hospitalized days during the last six months of life ranged from 
12.9 days per decedent at St. Mary’s Hospital (the principal hospital of the Mayo Clinic 
in Rochester, Minn.) to 23.9 at New York-Presbyterian Hospital.  The University of 
California at Los Angeles teaching hospital had the highest average number of days in 
intensive care units during the last six months of life (11.4 days per decedent), a rate 3.5 
times higher than the rate for patients treated at the University of California teaching 
hospital in San Francisco (3.3 days per decedent).  Medicare enrollees who were patients 
of the New York University Medical Center had an average of 76.2 physician visits 
during their last six months of life, almost one-third more than patients at the next-highest 
rate academic medical center, the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital (57.7 visits 
per decedent).  Patients of the University of Kentucky Hospital had slightly more than 
half as many (18.6) physician visits as the national average (33.5). 
Id. 
 224.  Id. (“The researchers studied patients with chronic illnesses because about 30 to 35 percent 
of Medicare dollars are spent on people with these conditions during last two years of their lives.  
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the best quality and ‘best’ outcomes utilized far fewer resources.”225  
Illustratively, “patients in low-cost, high-quality regions such as Salt Lake 
City, Utah, Rochester, Minn., and Portland, Ore., are admitted less 
frequently to hospitals, spend less time in intensive care units and see fewer 
specialists.”226  Thus, hospitals making low cost choices are not withholding 
needed care;227 they are providing more efficient care that produces better 
outcomes while using fewer resources.228  The authors of the study explain 
that “[t]hese organizations offer a benchmark of performance toward which 
other systems should strive.”  This study comports with other estimates that 
Medicare could save 30% of its costs if the over-use created by adherence to 
regional customs was rectified.229   
2.  An Increasing Number of State Tort Systems Are Shifting to 
Evidence-Based Care as the Standard of Care  
In contrast to the hospital peer review hearing system, state tort systems 
are gradually shifting away from what is presently the majority rule that 
relies upon customary practice as conclusive evidence of the standard of 
care.230  It appears that the courts in these states recognize the problems that 
come with the use of custom—as discussed above—as the exclusive proxy 
for quality.231  For instance, in a medical malpractice case, in order to meet 
the standard of care, a physician must “possess and use the care, skill and 
knowledge ordinarily possessed and used under like circumstances . . . .”232  
Two-thirds of those in the study were diagnosed with cancer, congestive heart failure and/or chronic 
lung disease.  ‘The majority of acute care hospitals are applying their standard forms of ‘rescue 
medicine’ to people who are in advanced stages of diseases that can’t be cured,’ said Wennberg.  
‘Patients don’t benefit—they can’t be rescued—and the costs of such care are very high, both in 
dollars spent and in providing care that the majority of chronically-ill patients might not want, such 
as admissions to intensive care and being sent to specialist after specialist.’”) 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 909 (2002) (discussing the merits of the role of custom as conclusive evidence of the 
standard of care in malpractice litigation and the movement by many states to use custom as only 
some evidence of the standard of care). 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Burns v. Metz, 513 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Neb. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ind. 1992) (judging the physician’s conduct by a “minimum 
standard of care for the particular practice” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  For an excellent 
overview of medical malpractice law, see DOBBS, supra note 157, at § 342, 634–35. 
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Instead of restricting the scope of evidence that is admissible to show what 
constitutes reasonable care to what is customarily done under the 
circumstances, a growing minority of state courts are permitting the 
introduction of into evidence of risk-benefit analysis grounded in empirical 
science to show what is reasonable care under the circumstances.233 
By transitioning away from custom as an exclusive proxy for quality, 
parts of the tort system appear to be acting instrumentally to benefit both the 
quality and cost of healthcare by encouraging evidence-based medical 
practice.234  Regrettably, as explained below, a large part of the tort system 
and the entire hospital peer review system are lagging behind and acting to 
thwart that transition. 
a.  Empirical Evidence of the Positive Impact on Quality of Healthcare 
of Rejecting Customary Care as the Exclusive Proxy for Quality 
Can using an evidence-based standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases and in the hospital peer review hearing process have a positive impact 
on the quality and cost of care?  The answer appears to be “yes.”  A recent 
empirical study employing data kept by the National Hospital Discharge 
Surveys on treatment utilization rates from 1977 to 2005 showed that there 
was “a 30–50 percent reduction in the gap between state and national 
utilization rates of various treatments and diagnostic procedures [including 
obstetric, cardiac and diagnostic procedures] following the adoption of a rule 
requiring physicians to follow national, as opposed to local, standards.”235  
Professor Michael Frakes of the Cornell Law School, who is the author of 
the study, found that: 
[C]ustom-based liability standards may indeed encourage the 
perpetuation of customary practices and likewise discourage 
deviations from custom. . . .   
 . . . .  
 . . .  [T]he results of this study more generally suggest that a 
malpractice rule that bases standards of care on customary physician 
practices may indeed incentivize the perpetuation of those 
customary practices and, at the same time, discouraging deviations 
 233.  See generally Peters, supra note 230 (discussing the minority of courts that have shifted 
away from customary practice analysis and the effect of risk-benefit evidence on juries). 
 234.  See infra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 235.  Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in 
Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 
257, 257 (2013). 
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from custom.  
 . . . .  
 . . .  The employment of custom-based standards, moreover, 
carries a number of important policy implications, particularly with 
respect to the possible role that they may play in discouraging cost-
reducing innovations in delivery practices.  Legal scholars have 
long recognized that the effectiveness of managed care and related 
strategies may be blunted by a medical liability system that holds 
physicians to a standard of care determined according to customary 
physician practices, where those practices were developed in a 
predominantly fee-for service environment that may have 
encouraged excessive practice styles. 236 
Professor Frakes further explains that, 
By arguably establishing the empirical relevancy of the customary 
component to malpractice standards, this study validates these 
concerns and thereby lends support to proposals that call for a 
relaxation of customary-standard requirements, including those that 
argue for a stronger role for “reasonableness” in malpractice-
standard determinations or, as above, a more definitive role for 
clinical practice guidelines237 in malpractice proceedings.238 
Just as the use of customary care standards in medical malpractice 
litigation may be acting to entrench custom-based decision making at the 
cost of quality of care, a similar result is likely to occur when the hospital 
peer review process employs the same customary care standard.  In fact, this 
deterrence effect is likely to be more significantly felt as the result of a 
negative peer review decision could mean the loss of a physician’s entire 
 236.  See Van Tassel, Harmonizing, supra note 12 (manuscript at 17–18) (on file with author); see 
Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician 
Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules (Working Paper, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
 237.  See Frakes, supra note 236.  The study done by Professor Frakes lends empirical support for 
arguments made in my 2006 article for a greater role for evidence based medicine, in the form of 
clinical practice guidelines, in the hospital peer review process.  See Van Tassel, Harmonizing, supra 
note 12 (manuscript at 18 n.89); see also Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1241–55. 
 238.  See Van Tassel, Harmonizing, supra note 12 (manuscript at 17–18); see Michael Frakes, The 
Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from 
the Adoption of National-Standard Rules (Working Paper, 2010) (on file with author). 
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career rather than just the need to pay money damages or increased 
insurance premiums. 
Support for this conclusion can be found in a study of ten hospital 
systems performed in 2010.239  This study was disturbing in that it revealed 
that avoidable physician errors are giving rise to the same rate of patient 
deaths as was reported over ten years ago in the IOM report.240  This death 
rate remains unchanged in spite of multiple initiatives to improve quality.241  
There are still approximately 98,000 people who die each year from 
preventable physician mistakes.242  One of the important findings of the 2010 
study is that “the penetration of evidence-based safety practices has been 
quite modest. . . .  Compliance with even simple interventions such as hand 
washing is poor in many centers.”243 
This Article suggests that one reason for the failure of evidence-based 
practices to penetrate into daily medical practice may be the continued use 
of customary care as the exclusive proxy for quality of care by the tort, 
licensure, and hospital peer review systems.244 
B.  The Impact of Standards That Vest Complete Discretion in Hospital 
Administrators on Healthcare Quality 
The second category of standards most commonly used in hospital peer 
review are those that vest complete discretion to hospital administrators to 
sanction physicians.  The most obvious example of this kind of standard is 
one that gives a hospital’s governing body “the right to remove any member 
of the medical staff or to deprive any physician or surgeon of the privileges 
of the hospital whenever in their sole judgment the good of the hospital or 
the patients therein may demand it.”245  Other bylaws in this category are less 
obvious but are just as subjective when applied.  These “beauty is in the eye 
of the beholder” standards define the required level of competence as 
achieving “high quality medical care”246 or providing “adequate” medical 
 239.  Landrigan et al., supra note 79, at 2130 (“In a statewide study of 10 North Carolina 
hospitals, we found that harm resulting from medical care was common, with little evidence that rate 
of harm had decreased substantially over a 6-year period ending in December 2007.”). 
 240.  See id. 
 241.  See id.  
 242.  See id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  See infra Part V. 
 245.  N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 2–5 (Fla. 1962) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Tasher v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., No. 87-1139, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1018, at *5 
(E.D. La. 1988) (“[E]xecutive Committee has been given [complete discretion] to summarily 
suspend privileges ‘whenever action must be taken immediately in the best interest of patient care in 
the hospital;’” this same broad standard was applied at the post-deprivation hearing). 
 246.  Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dirs. of St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 (Cal. Ct. 
02 VAN TASSEL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:25 PM 
[Vol. 40: 911, 2013] Curing the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System  
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
953 
care247 or the “best possible care.”248  These standards supply little to no 
limitation on the discretion of the decision-makers resulting in a high risk of 
capricious and arbitrary decision-making.249 
Without limits on the discretion of the decision-makers, physicians 
could be excluded for economic,250 personal,251 or discriminatory252 reasons 
unrelated to patient safety.253  Some are concerned that there is a growing use 
of peer review to silence whistleblowers calling an alarm on poor quality or 
high-risk practices.254  Another problem with these vague standards is that 
they fail to provide notice of what conduct will trigger an investigation and 
reporting to the NPDB.255 
Of import is that the catalogue of process protections provided by most 
App. 1985) (describing standard that excluded physicians who did not provide “high quality” care 
from staff privileges); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1399–1401 (Or. 1975) (describing 
how hospitals may require that physicians provide a higher quality of medical care). 
 247.  Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. of the Mary Frances Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W.2d 284, 296–97 
(Iowa 1966) (failure to provide “adequate” medical care); see also Bock v. John C. Lincoln Hosp., 
702 P.2d 253, 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (recounting that physician’s staff privileges were 
terminated because executive committee determined that physician “failed to demonstrate to the 
Medical Committee that [he was] qualified to practice as an Internal Medicine specialist”). 
 248.  Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 345 P.2d 93, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (only physicians 
and surgeons who, in the judgment of the board, would provide the “best possible care and 
professional skill” were granted staff privileges); see also Duby v. Jordan Hosp., 341 N.E.2d 876, 
880 (Mass. 1976) (“[The hospital,] in judging the [physician’s] professional competence required 
that he give his patients the ‘best possible care.’”); Huffaker, 540 P.2d at 1399 (physician must 
provide to patients “a high quality of medical care”). 
 249.  Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1209–10. 
 250.  See generally John D. Blum, Economic Credentialing: A New Twist in Hospital Appraisal 
Processes, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 427 (1991); John D. Blum, Hospital-Medical Staff Relations in the 
Face of Shifting Institutional Business Strategies: A Legal Analysis, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
561 (1991); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health 
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988); Judith E. Orie, Article, Economic 
Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 437 (1998). 
 251.  See generally PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK, supra note 92, at app. B. 
 252.  See generally id., at app. A. 
 253.  The immunity protections put into place by both HCQIA and state immunity legislation 
result in a loss of access to the judicial system by these aggrieved physicians.  See supra Parts II–III.  
If peer review is being used for purposes unrelated to quality of care, then this loss of legal recourse 
is unjustified.  Since HCQIA immunity was put into place to encourage peer review that enhanced 
the quality of patient care while at the same time protecting physicians’ interests, it is questionable 
whether peer review proceedings that act merely to protect hospital autonomy in decision-making 
should enjoy HCQIA protections.  This type of standard coupled with HCQIA immunity 
unjustifiably cuts off a physician’s ability to challenge staffing decisions unrelated to quality of care 
concerns through a judicial appeal. 
 254.  See infra notes 258–62. 
 255.   See Moore v. Bd. of Trs. of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d 605, 607–09 (Nev. 1972) 
(discussing bylaw that allowed for termination for “unprofessional conduct”). 
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hospitals under HCQIA as a condition for judicial immunity, such as the 
right to counsel and some kind of hearing, are empty formalities if, at the 
conclusion of the hearing, the decision-makers can follow their unfettered 
personal predilections in deciding the merits.256 
A major implication is the impact that the current NPDB process is 
having on whistleblowers and what this means to quality of care.257  Veteran 
reporters Steve Twedt and John Beale of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette wrote a 
whole series of excellent articles detailing the stories of physician 
whistleblowers who claim that they were punished for pointing out quality 
of care problems through the use of, or the threat of the use of, hospital peer 
review.258 
 ‘It is clear that we are hearing of more cases of these kind of 
really difficult conflicts occurring between hospitals, and, in some 
instances, hospital boards, and the medical staff,’ said Dr. Paul M. 
Schyve, senior vice president of the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, which accredits most 
U.S. hospitals.  Schyve said one factor driving these disputes is the 
economic pressure hospitals face to keep costs down and maintain a 
 256.  Tying into this consideration is the fact that these vague standards raise questions about the 
meaningfulness of judicial review.  As one court described, absent clearly articulated criteria, “it is 
impossible for any reviewing body to objectively and independently determine if an applicant has 
established ‘competence.’”  Kiester v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 843 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Alaska 
1992).  Thus, courts will be unable to determine whether the peer review result was driven by 
considerations unrelated to the quality of patient care. 
 257.  The story of Dr. Ulrich is a good example of how the current vague standards, coupled with 
the broad judicial interpretation of HCQIA immunity, can have a negative impact on quality of 
patient care.  Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. C-99-05003-THE, 2004 WL 1635542 (N.D. Cal. 
Jul. 12, 2004); see also Steve Twedt, The Cost of Courage: How the Tables Turn on Doctors, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/news/us/the-cost-of-courage-how-the-tables-turn-on-doctors-520650/.  Dr. 
Ulrich raised red flags about the negative impact that staffing cuts would have on quality of patient 
care.  See Ulrich, 2004 WL 1635542.  Within two weeks of making his complaints, Dr. Ulrich 
learned that he was being investigated for alleged clinical incompetence.  Id.  After he resigned, he 
was reported to the state licensure board and the NPDB.  Id.  This story is being repeated across the 
country, with whistleblowers who protest problems with quality of patient care being threatened with 
peer review investigation and NPDB reporting to silence their criticisms.  See Twedt, supra (“In 
medical centers as small as Centre Community Hospital in State College and as prestigious as Yale 
and Cornell, doctors who step forward to warn of unsafe conditions or a colleague’s poor work say 
they have been targeted by hospital administrations or boards.”). 
 258.  An excellent and well-researched series on the number of physicians who have been targeted 
by abusive uses of peer review is detailed in an extensive series of articles written by Steve Twedt 
and John Beale of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.  See, e.g., Twedt, supra note 257 (first of the series).  
Additionally, there are a growing number of organizations that support physicians in their allegations 
against “sham peer review,” such as: the Center for Peer Review Justice, the Semmelweis Society, 
the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, and the Alliance for Patient Safety. 
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good imagine.259 
Physician whistleblowers are uniquely vulnerable.  If a physician 
whistleblower is labeled as a disruptive physician, the whistleblower can 
“face sanctions and effective banishment from the profession.  That gives 
hospitals considerable leverage when conflicts occur.”260 
The negative impact that peer review may be having on whistleblowers 
raises the question of whether the broad judicial interpretation of HCQIA 
immunity for hospital peer review has an unintended effect of silencing 
those who are most able to identify quality of care problems.261  Before the 
creation of the NPDB Reporting System, physicians were in the unique 
position of being able to speak up without fear of retribution when hospital 
practices placed patients at risk of harm.  These voices may now be silenced 
by the threat of peer review. 
V.  DOES THE HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW HEARING SYSTEM NEGATIVELY 
IMPACT ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE? 
According to physicians, the termination of staff privileges triggered by 
a negative peer review report that is also filed with the NPDB can be a 
“career ender” because it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to obtain staff 
privileges in another hospital or a new position that does not require staff 
privileges thereafter.262  What many seem to lose sight of is that a 
 259.  Twedt, supra note 257. 
 260.  Id.  A University of Baltimore study was ordered by the Maryland General Assembly on 
credentialing.  The study found that whistleblower physicians who alienate hospital officials are 
vulnerable to having their admitting privileges taken away, with devastating effects on their 
practices.  See Twedt, supra note 257.  In an extreme example, one physician faced exactly this 
situation as a result of pushing for an investigation into a nurse allegedly murdering patients night 
after night.  Steve Twedt, Doctors Pay for Reporting Suspicions: Statistics Linked Deaths to a Single 
Nurse, but Hospital Officials Didn’t Want to Hear about It, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 
2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/us/doctors-pay-for-reporting-
suspicions-520698/.  In one survey of 448 emergency room physicians across the U.S., 23% reported 
that they had lost a job, or had been threatened with job loss, when they had raised quality of care 
concerns.  Id. 
 261.  Twedt, supra note 257. 
 ‘We’re the only people who can stand up for patients,’ said Dr. Scott Plantz, an 
emergency medicine specialist who headed the survey of emergency physicians.  ‘The 
nurses can’t, because they’re employees of the hospital.  But doctors aren’t, or at least 
they weren’t in the past.  With managed care and doctors working for hospitals, it gets 
worse and worse and worse.’ 
 Id. 
 262.  See supra notes 143–51 and accompanying text; see also McCall, supra note 124, at 175 (“A 
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physician’s inability to practice has a ripple effect—when a physician can no 
longer practice medicine, all of that physician’s patients lose access to 
healthcare.  This situation could impact hundreds of people for every 
physician who is forced out of practice. 
The loss of their physician is especially hard on those who are 
dependent on Medicaid and Medicare; it could be years before they are able 
to find a new physician willing to take on new Medicaid or Medicare 
patients.  This situation will grow exponentially worse as the physician 
shortage grows and millions of new ACA patients and aging baby boomers 
flood the system.  The loss of the ability to practice medicine and its ripple 
effect may have a particularly negative potential impact on minority 
physicians and minority and low-income patients. 
A.  The Impact of the Hospital Peer Review System on the Physician 
Shortage Crisis 
The reliance by the hospital peer review hearing process on the ill-
advised “bad apples” approach and on faulty standard of care provisions to 
eliminate physicians from the practice of medicine could not come at a 
worse time—a time when the United States is facing a crisis over the 
shortage of physicians.  The United States is undoubtedly already in the 
midst of a medical malpractice crisis.263  What is missing from the 
ObamaCare plan under ACA is a strategy to provide enough doctors to care 
for the approximately thirty million new or expanded-care patients who will 
enter our Medicaid, Medicare, and insured-payment medical system in the 
next few years.264  According to a recent study by the Association of 
American Medical Colleges, there already is a shortage of physicians in a 
large number of states.265  Many rural and urban areas have no primary care 
doctors or necessary specialists.266  When an estimated thirty million 
Americans flood into the system, many will not be able to find a physician 
who is willing to take on new patients.267  Add to this mix the fact that one-
physician’s livelihood is dependent on acquiring and maintaining hospital staff privileges.”). 
 263.  See supra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 264.  See Lisa Clemans-Cope et al., The Affordable Care Act’s Coverage Expansions Will Reduce 
Differences in Uninsurance Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 31 HEALTH AFF. 920, 920 (2012). 
 265. See Ass’n. Am. Med. Colls., Recent Studies and Reports on Physician Shortages in the U.S. 
ASS’N AM. MED. COLLEGES (Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.aamc.org/download/100598/data/ 
recentworkforcestudies.pdf. 
 266.  See Ass’n. Am. Med. Colls., 2011 State Physician Workforce Data Book, ASS’N AM. MED. 
COLLEGES (Nov. 2011), https://www.aamc.org/download/263512/data/statedata2011.pdf. 
 267.  Mike Alberti, Warnings of Doctor Shortage Go Unheeded, REMAPPING DEBATE (Feb. 17, 
2011), http://www.remappingdebate.org/article/warnings-doctor-shortage-go-unheeded (“As of 
September 2009, at least 80 million Americans lived in areas with a shortage of medical practitioners 
in at least one field, according the Health Resources and Services Administration.  Many of those 
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third of all current doctors are expected to retire by 2020.268 
It appears that there are no solutions immediately forthcoming.  The 
number of physician training residencies and the number of doctors entering 
the workforce through U.S. residence training have been frozen for decades 
at 100,000 by Medicare.269  And only 900 residency positions (an increase of 
approximately 1%) have been funded to deal with the physician shortage.270  
Unfortunately, Medicare funding to teaching hospitals is likely to be cut, 
creating uncertainty over whether even the present number of residency 
positions will be funded.271  Even the American Medical Association is 
urging the government to increase funding for residency training.272 
Adding to this looming crisis, the cost-cutting measures of the new 
ObamaCare program under ACA will drastically cut reimbursement of 
Medicare and Medicaid to cover the costs of the expansion of care.273  In 
2009, it was reported that an estimated one-fourth of all doctors refused to 
take Medicare patients, and one-half refused Medicaid patients.274  A new 
report issued in 2012 reveals that the number of physicians turning away 
areas have a lack of access to primary care doctors, dentists, or mental health professionals.  In 2006, 
30 percent of U.S. counties lacked a single surgeon, according to the American College of Surgeons.  
Shortages have also been reported in several other fields in recent years, including pediatrics, 
radiology, and endocrinology.”). 
 268.  See Mark J. Perry, There’s a Coming Doctor Shortage: But Why?, CARPE DIEM (Jan. 24, 
2011), http:/www.mjperry.blogspot.com/2011/01/theres-coming-doctor-shortage-but-why.html; see 
also Alberti, supra note 267. 
 269.  See Ass’n. Am. Med. Colls., U.S. Medical School Applicants and Students 1982–83 to 
2010–2012, ASS’N AM. MED. COLLEGES (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.aamc.org/download/ 
153708/data/charts1982to2012.pdf (illustrating the flat medical student enrollment since 1980). 
 270.  Shawn Tully, Health Care Reform Can’t Work Without More Doctors, CNN MONEY (Apr. 
6, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/06/news/doctor_shortage_healthcare.fortune/ 
index.htm. 
 271.  See Robert Pear, Reshaping Medicare Brings Hard Choices, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/us/politics/13medicare.html?_r=0.  At the debate over last 
year’s health plan, Pear noted that Republicans accused Obama of “raiding Medicare” to pay for the 
new program providing insurance for people under 65.  See id.  Senator Jim Risch of Idaho said, 
“We are talking about a half-trillion dollars that is being stolen from Medicare.”  See id.  Senator 
Charles E. Grassley of Iowa said the cuts “threatened seniors” access to care.  See id. 
 272.  AM. MED. ASS’N, LIFTING THE CAP ON MEDICARE-FUNDED RESIDENCY SLOTS REDUCES 
THE SHORTAGE OF PHYSICIANS, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/mss/lobby-day-
gme.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 273.  See Julie Connelly, Doctors Are Opting Out of Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/business/retirementspecial/02health.html; see also Tully, supra 
note 270. 
 274.  Tully, supra note 270; see also Alberti, supra note 267; Recent Studies and Reports on 
Physician Shortages in the U.S., supra note 265; Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, 
Patients Are Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/ 
health/policy/16medicaid.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Medicaid patients has increased to one in three physicians.275 
B.  Consequences of the Loss of Their Physician on Low-Income Patients 
When physicians lose their ability to practice medicine through a 
negative peer review report in the NPDB, there can be a large ripple effect.  
All of a physician’s hundreds of patients lose access to their physician of 
choice.  And, for many low-income Medicaid and Medicare patients, the 
loss of their physician can mean the loss of access to health care entirely for 
a substantial period of time, up to several years, as they search for a 
replacement physician who is willing to take on new Medicaid or Medicare 
patients.276  The looming physician shortage, coupled with the growing 
number of physicians who already refuse to take on Medicare (25%) and 
Medicaid (33%) patients, means that this problem will become exponentially 
worse. 
Adding yet another negative element to this problem is the possibility 
that a hospital will engage in the practice of economic credentialing, which 
favors granting hospital staff privileges to physicians whose patients are 
self-payors or who are covered by private insurers.  The practice of 
economic credentialing disfavors physicians who have practices made up of 
low-income patients covered by low-reimbursement public insurance such 
as Medicaid.277 
These problems make a compelling case that HCQIA should be 
amended to require the NPDB to gather data on the makeup of the patient 
populations of the physicians targeted by the hospital peer review hearing 
process. 
C.  Are Minority Physicians at the Highest Risk for Career Destruction? 
Those physicians who have a high-minority practice evidence 
significantly more reporting of problems providing quality of care.278  
Importantly, these physicians report that inability to pay, language barriers, a 
high proportion of Medicaid patients, and increased patient volume to 
compensate for lower revenue flows are the root causes of these problems.279  
 275.  See Lowes, supra note 146. 
 276.  Stephen Zuckerman et al., Changes in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998–2003: Implications 
for Physician Participation, 28 HEALTH AFF. w510 (June 23, 2004), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/suppl/2004/06/17/hlthaff.w4.374.DC1. 
 277.  See generally Blum, Economic Credentialing, supra note 250; Blum, Hospital-Medical Staff 
Relations, supra note 250; Hall, supra note 250; Orie, supra note 250. 
 278.  James D. Reschovsky & Ann S. O’Malley, Do Primary Care Physicians Treating Minority 
Patients Report Problems Delivering High-Quality Care?, 27 HEALTH AFF. w222 (Apr. 22, 2008), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/3/w222.long. 
 279.  Id. 
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This suggests that the answer is not to terminate these physicians through 
negative peer review reporting, thereby contributing to the growing 
physician shortage, but, instead, to find solutions to deal with these root 
causes that this population of physicians are experiencing in their struggle to 
provide quality care. 
Most of the physicians who have high-minority practices are themselves 
minorities.280  By inference, this may mean that minority physicians are 
likely to have a higher level of problems with the provision of quality of 
care, making it possible that they are being targeted more often by the 
hospital peer review process.  This could have serious unintended 
consequences to access to healthcare by minorities, as discussed in the next 
section.281  HCQIA should be amended to collect data on the minority status 
of the physicians who receive negative reports that are published by the 
NPDB in order to determine if this is, in fact, happening. 
D.  Are Minority Patients at the Highest Risk for Loss of Access to 
Healthcare? 
Minority physicians are more likely to have high-minority practices.282  
If minority physicians with high-minority practices are more likely to be 
targeted by the hospital peer review hearing process, then these minority 
patients are more likely to lose their physicians, and furthermore, to lose 
access to healthcare for the ever growing number of years that it takes to 
find a new healthcare provider.283  There is already a significant disparity of 
minority access to healthcare in this country, a problem that several 
provisions of the new ObamaCare legislation under ACA are designed to 
address.284  If minority patients are losing access to healthcare as a result of 
the hospital peer review process, then the hospital peer review system is 
undermining yet another one of the goals of ACA. 
Currently, 14.8% of the white population, 32.2% of the black 
population, and 28.9% of the Hispanic population are covered by 
 280.  Id. at w224. 
 281.  See infra Part V.D. 
 282.  See Reschovsky & O’Malley, supra note 278, at w.226. 
 283.  HHS Action Plan to Reduce Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. (Apr. 2011), http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/npa/files/Plans/HHS/HHS_Plan_com 
plete.pdf. 
 284.  Clemans-Cope, supra note 264, at 926–27.  Currently, 21.6% of blacks and 33.3% of 
Hispanics are uninsured.  Id. exhibit 2, at 925.  By 2019, under ACA, 9.8% of blacks and 21.1% of 
Hispanics will be uninsured.  Id. 
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government provided health insurance under Medicaid, CHIP (Children’s 
Health Insurance Program), Medicare, and other public coverage.285  
Consequently, the black and Hispanic populations are already 
disproportionately feeling the effect of loss of access to healthcare through 
the refusal of physicians to take on new Medicaid and Medicare patients.286  
These effects will exponentially worsen with the influx of thirty million 
people into the medical system under ACA starting in 2014 and the 
additional influx of baby boomers into Medicare over the coming years.  
Add to this picture the likely negative effect of the hospital peer review 
hearing process on minority physicians and their minority patient 
populations made up of a substantial number of Medicaid patients, and the 
access problem becomes one of access to physicians, not insurance. 
The question of whether the hospital peer review system is having 
serious unintended consequences by negatively impacting access to 
healthcare by minorities gives more strength to the argument that HCQIA 
should be amended to collect data on the minority status of the physicians 
who receive negative reports that are published by the NPDB.287 
VI.  SOLUTIONS 
The hospital peer review hearing system should be completely 
restructured to comport with the current scientific understandings of the 
methodologies that best act to prevent medical errors.288  The “bad apples” 
approach that currently drives hospital peer review actually has a negative 
effect on healthcare quality.289  This “bad apples” approach should be 
jettisoned and a new systems approach should be developed that relies on 
the application of a blend of knowledge translation theory with continuous 
quality improvement research to integrate evidence-based treatment choices 
using clinical practice guidelines into physician practice.  In order to 
optimize this systems approach to error prevention, this new system should 
be coupled with the adoption of a version of the anonymous third-party error 
reporting system long advocated by the healthcare quality improvement 
movement and successfully utilized by the airline industry. 
A.  Removing the Customary Care Malpractice Standard Roadblock to 
Adoption of Evidence-Based Standards 
To date, initiatives designed to integrate evidence-based treatment 
 285.  Id. exhibit 2, at 925. 
 286.  See Connelly, supra note 273; Tully, supra note 270; see also Alberti, supra note 267. 
 287.  See infra Part VI. 
 288.  See supra Part III.A. 
 289.  See supra Part III. 
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choices into day-to-day physician practice have be largely unsuccessful.290  
Many studies show that physicians are being introduced to evidence-based 
medicine in the form of clinical practice guidelines on a consistent basis—
they go to continuing medical education seminars, pay attention, agree that 
changing practice habits is a good idea, then go back to practice and 
disregard the new information.291  As mentioned earlier, one study of ten 
hospital systems found that, in the decade since the seminal Institute of 
Medicine report that initially revealed that 98,000 patients die in hospitals 
every year from avoidable medical errors, “the penetration of evidence-
based safety practices has been quite modest.  For example, . . . 
[c]ompliance with even simple interventions such as hand washing is poor in 
many centers.”292 
One of the two most likely reasons for this disappointing situation is the 
use of customary care standards to gauge medical malpractice liability in the 
majority of states.  If Professor Frakes is correct that medical practice is, in 
part, shaped by liability standards,293 then the first step in cutting this 
Gordian Knot is for all states to adopt the minority rule that allows evidence-
based choices to be introduced as evidence of reasonable care in medical 
malpractice litigation and licensure review.  Top-down initiatives294 and 
social media efforts295 will be needed to educate legislators, judges, and 
lawyers regarding this much needed change to the scope of evidence that is 
relevant on the issue of the standard of care. 
At the same time, hospitals must make the same changes as the tort 
system in the standards they use in hospital peer review.  This change can be 
encouraged by amending HCQIA to condition immunity from suit for peer 
review participants, including the hospital, upon modifications of their 
standards to allow evidence-based choices to be introduced as evidence of 
 290.  See supra Part IV.A.2, Part IV.B. 
 291.  See generally Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice 
Guidelines?, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999); see also authorities cited supra note 173. 
 292.   Landrigan et al., supra note 79, at 2130. 
 293.  See generally Frakes, supra note 235. 
 294.  Initiatives such as: preparation of a Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) class for judges 
and lawyers that can be distributed nationally to state bar associations; articles that can be placed in 
bar association newsletters; drafts of proposed legislation sent to legislators; and other efforts of this 
kind. 
 295.  See, e.g., Van Tassel, ACA, supra note 3; Healthcare Reform Could Impact Medical 
Malpractice and Peer Review: The Supreme Court Ruling on ACA Reinforces a Transition to 
Evidence-Based Care, but Malpractice Liability Currently Favors Custom-Based Medicine, 
CREDENTIALING & PEER REV. LEGAL INSIDER, (Credentialing & Peer Review Legal Insider, 
Danvers, Mass.), Sept. 1, 2012 (detailing an interview with Professor Katharine Van Tassel). 
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reasonable care. 
B.  Translating Knowledge into Action 
1.  The Seven Phases of Knowledge Translation Theory 
The second most likely reason that physicians are not integrating 
evidence-based treatment choices into their practices is the failure to use the 
large body of empirical research generated by behavioral scientists that deals 
with the well-studied problem of how to translate new knowledge into 
action.  This research has led to the creation of what many call “knowledge 
translation theory” or “research implementation theory.”296  According to 
knowledge translation theory, the successful translation of knowledge into 
action occurs in seven separate action phases: 
(1) Specifically identifying the problem; 
(2) Identifying, reviewing, and selecting the knowledge to 
implement; 
(3) Adapting or customizing the knowledge to the local context; 
(4) Assessing the determinants of knowledge use; 
(5) Selecting, tailoring, implementing, and monitoring knowledge 
translation interventions and knowledge uptake; 
(6) Evaluating outcomes or impact of using the knowledge; and, 
(7) Determining strategies for ensuring sustained knowledge use.297 
These seven action steps can occur in sequence or simultaneously.298  In 
addition, the process is meant to be dynamic, with the knowledge steps 
changing the action phases at any point in the process.299  The goal of the 
action phases is to use planned action theories to consciously engineer 
change in healthcare systems and groups.300  An important part of the theory 
is to actively consider the context in which the physicians are working to be 
 296.  See generally Sharon E. Straus, Jacqueline M. Tetroe & Ian D. Graham, Knowledge 
Translation Is the Use of Knowledge in Health Care Decision Making, 64 J. CLINICAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 6 (2011). 
 297.  Id. at 8–9. 
 298.  Id. at 9. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Id. 
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sure that barriers to knowledge assimilation as well as barriers to 
implementation are always considered and addressed.301 
2.  Using Knowledge Translation Theory to Integrate Evidence-Based 
Treatment Choices into Physician Practice 
In addition to the top-down initiatives mentioned above, bottom-up, 
grass roots efforts must also be made.  The bottom-up portion of the solution 
that this Article proposes is the use of knowledge translation theory to 
incorporate knowledge about empirically tested treatment choices into 
everyday physician practice.  The knowledge that this proposal focuses on is 
the use of evidence-based guidelines called clinical practice guidelines 
(CPGs) to guide treatment choices.302  CPGs identify optimum treatment 
choices which are derived from clinical outcomes and effectiveness 
research.303  CPGs reflect the “well-considered opinions of expert panels, 
based upon reviews of the best available data, as to how physicians should 
approach certain clinical problems.”304  The use of CPGs to guide clinical 
decision-making shows great promise for improving quality of care through 
the use of what are called “best practices,”305 as well as for decreasing costs 
through the use of less costly choices that result in the same or better 
outcomes as higher cost alternatives.306 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  CPGs are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions 
about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”  INST. OF MED., CLINICAL 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr 
eds., 1990). 
 303.  Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1242. 
 304.  Leahy, supra note 162, at 1506. 
 305.  See Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 
HEALTH MATRIX 369, 384–95 (1995); see also AM. MED. ASS’N, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
PRACTICE PARAMETERS (1990); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM’N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONG. 219–36 (recommending federal support for effectiveness research and development of 
practice guidelines); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing 
Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87.  See generally David M. 
Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: Theory vs Practice-Reply, 264 JAMA 1534, 1534 (1990); Clark C. 
Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777 
(1990) [hereinafter Havighurst, Policy Rationale]; Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, 
Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1989); Leahy, supra note 162; William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in 
Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197 
(1988) (authored by officials of the Health Care Financing Administration proposal); Joint Comm’n 
on Accreditation of Hosps., Symposium, Getting It Right: The Making of Practice Guidelines, 16 
QUALITY REV. BULL. 38, 40 (1990). 
 306.  See Rosoff, supra note 305, at 370. 
02 VAN TASSEL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:25 PM 
 
964 
a.  Applying Steps One Through Three of Knowledge Translation 
Theory 
The first step in this process is for each specific practice area within a 
hospital to set up a working committee.  This working committee will be 
tasked with identifying an initial set of CPGs that are appropriate to adopt 
into that particular practice context, taking into consideration the resources 
of the hospital, the particular characteristics and needs of that particular 
hospital’s patients, as well as the skill sets of the physicians who are part of 
the practice area.  Ultimately, this working committee will propose to the 
entire practice area a set of CPGs that have been tailored to fit the clinical 
care expectations of the practice group as a whole. 
For instance, the working committee of the cardiology practice group of 
a hospital could start with the CPGs published by the American College of 
Cardiology (ACC).307  The CPG working committee will then evaluate and 
modify these CPGs,308 taking into consideration the proposed changes of the 
entire practice area to tailor the CPGs to collective practice style and 
professional judgments of all of the physicians in the practice area.  In order 
to obtain modifications that are both relevant and feasible, the working 
committee will first have to educate all of the physicians in the practice area 
regarding the science behind the CPGs and how the CPGs could improve the 
quality of patient care.  Once there is a consensus on which suggested 
 307.  There are two main questions that a CPG committee should investigate when choosing the 
appropriate CPGs.  First, who created the CPGs?  And second, what scientific methods were used in 
the creation of the CPG?  It is advisable for physicians to rely upon CPGs created by groups with 
“auspice legitimacy,” in other words, those developers with excellent reputations for accuracy and 
technical expertise.  See Rosoff, supra note 305, at 384–95.  These are most likely to be large, 
national groups that represent practice specialties, such as the American College of Cardiology or 
the American Heart Association.  It is also recommended that physicians avoid CPGs promulgated 
by payors, referred to by some as “boundary guidelines.”  Boundary guidelines “are used by payers 
[sic] to define the range of practice options within which physicians could act without incurring 
financial or other sanctions.”  Havighurst, Policy Rationale, supra note 305, at 777–78 & n.3 
(quoting LEWIN & ERICKSON, LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES: THE 
ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS 3 (rev. ed. 1989) (prepared for the Physician 
Payment Review Commission’s Conference on Practice Guidelines, Washington, D.C., Oct. 11, 
1988)).  These CPGs are based on cost-benefit choices motivated by profit.  See id.  CPGs that call 
for the provision of less care could increase the risk of malpractice exposure. 
 308.  In addition, the CPG committee must evaluate the scientific basis for the CPG in great detail.  
Was the patient population that made up the clinical practice database sufficiently large?  Were the 
results grounded on well-accepted scientific outcomes research?  Were the methodologies used 
appropriate for the context and were they used under the guidance of qualified medical 
professionals?  If any of these questions are answered in the negative, the CPG should be avoided.  
On the other hand, if the CPG was created to optimize quality of care by competent scientists based 
on careful analysis of an appropriately large database and the results were controlled for 
confounding, bias, and probability issues, the CPG could be a candidate for adoption, taking into 
consideration the nature of the specific practice.  See Rosoff, supra note 305, 384–95.  Thus, the 
CPG committee should only choose to adopt gold standard CPGs—which are those promulgated by 
groups with auspice authenticity and created using good scientific techniques. 
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modifications should be made, the working committee will integrate these 
changes into the CPGs.  At this point, the working committee will then 
recommend the modified CPGs to the entire group for adoption.309 
The process described so far relies on steps one through three of 
knowledge translation theory.  These initial steps have specifically identified 
the problem (particular instances of conflicts between treatment choices 
suggested by customary practice versus evidence-based practice), will have 
identified, reviewed, and selected the knowledge to implement (which CPGs 
to adopt), and will have adapted or customized the knowledge for the local 
context (modification of the CPGs to reflect the collective practice style and 
professional judgments of all of the physicians in the practice area). 
b.  Applying Steps Four Through Seven of Knowledge Translation 
Theory 
To be sure that the initial set of CPGs are reviewed and modified on a 
yearly basis, a CPG standing committee must be appointed every year.  For 
example, the CPG standing committee will review all of the yearly 
distributions from the ACC (or another appropriate group which has auspice 
authenticity and promulgates gold standard CPGs310) and then make 
recommendations to the cardiology practice group—for adoption, revision, 
 309.  The amount of time, duplication of effort, and expense associated with this CPG review 
enterprise is a legitimate criticism of this proposal.  One solution to these concerns is to follow the 
lead of the institutional review boards (IRBs) of medical institutions which conduct multicenter trials 
during clinical investigations of drugs and devices. 
[S]ometimes the IRB at each center of a multicenter trial conducts a complete review of 
the protocol and informed consent.  Such multiple reviews by multiple IRBs can result in 
unnecessary duplication of effort, delays, and increased expenses in the conduct of 
multicenter clinical trials.  Greater reliance on a centralized IRB review process, in 
appropriate circumstances, could reduce IRB burdens and delays in the conduct of 
multicenter trials. 
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY USING A CENTRALIZED IRB 
REVIEW PROCESS IN MULTICENTER CLINICAL TRIALS pt. II, at 2 (Mar. 2006) (footnotes omitted), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm127013.pdf.  For 
example, central IRBs have been created to review multicenter trials dealing with a particular type of 
condition.  “[T]he National Cancer Institute (NCI) has created a freestanding central IRB (NCI 
central IRB) to provide the option for centralized IRB review for the many multicenter cancer trials 
conducted by NCI.”  Id. pt VII.B, at 10.  Similarly, CPG committees with comparable practice 
specialties could contract with a centralized CPG review group to perform a continuous review of 
CPGs to reflect scientific developments.  The recommendations of this centralized CPG group could 
then be submitted to the CPG committee of the local institution for adoption, adoption with 
modification, or rejection.  This pooling of resources is one way to deal with the concerns of 
duplication of effort, delay, and expense. 
 310.  See supra Part II.B–C. 
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or rejection. 
The CPGs adopted by the practice area will then become the 
performance expectations for that practice area and every physician who is a 
member of that department will be expected to comply with the CPGs 
except in situations where, in the judgment of the physician, they are not 
appropriate.311  If the CPGs are not appropriate—and all agree that not every 
patient fits the norm—the physician will be expected to engage in 
documentation of the reasons for deviating from the CPGs.  A physician 
who fails to comply with the CPGs without a well-documented rationale 
should be subject to corrective action.  This process tracks the libertarian 
paternalism theory advanced by Professor Richard Thaler of the University 
of Chicago and Professor Cass Sunstein of Harvard University.312  Like the 
libertarian paternalism theory, this proposal starts with a default position that 
assumes the adoption of the best practice under the circumstances that is 
derived from empirical evidence but then allows for the physician to make 
an individual choice in deviating from this default if it is reasonable to do 
so.313  This proposal has no room for an irrational or thoughtless choice to 
deviate from the default.  Similar to the evaluation process that a reasonable 
person should use before crossing the street—“stop, look, and listen”—
CPGs request that physicians stop and think before deciding not to follow 
 311.  As Professor Rosoff explains: 
 The goal of . . . CPGs is not, despite what some physicians may believe, to remove all 
elements of discretion and professional judgment from medical care.  There will always 
be the need—and, one would hope, the latitude—for the exercise of professional 
judgment.  Still, as the body of what is knowable and what is known grows, the degree of 
latitude will inevitably be impacted by the extant knowledge base.  When one does not 
know what is right or wrong, everything is fair game to do.  Knowledge brings 
limitations, or at least, the basis for limitations to be imposed.  As an Institute of 
Medicine committee on Practice Guidelines has stated, the formal recognition of the 
practice guidelines movement ‘can be seen as part of a significant cultural shift, a move 
away from unexamined reliance on professional judgment toward more structured 
support and accountability for such judgment.’ 
Rosoff, supra note 305, at 375 (footnotes omitted). 
 312.  Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003). 
 313.  Id. 
 The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both 
possible and desirable for private and public institutions to influence behavior while also 
respecting freedom of choice.  Often people’s preferences are unclear and ill-formed, and 
their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting 
points.  In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided.  Equipped with 
an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, 
libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting 
directions without eliminating freedom of choice.  It is also possible to show how a 
libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much 
choice to offer.  Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor 
law, and consumer protection. 
 Id. 
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the CPG.  Next, the physician must document the rationale for the decision 
to reject the CPG.  This documentation provides data for compliance review 
and CPG evaluation by risk management. 
Applying the paternalistic libertarian model acknowledges that much of 
medical practice still operates in an area of scientific uncertainty, where one 
size does not fit all and the art of medicine must come into play.  This model 
permits physicians to work from a more uniform starting point in the 
decision-making tree that is grounded upon empirical data for the treatment 
of “norm,” while allowing for the freedom required by scientific uncertainty 
to employ the medical arts to make a different choice if reasonable. 
However, allowing for a “safe harbor” from tort liability just because a 
physician mechanically follows a CPG is not wise.  Not every patient fits the 
norm.  There continues to be a great deal of scientific uncertainty when it 
comes to the best treatment for many conditions, most particularly when it 
comes to the treatment of outliers.  As the practice of evidence-based 
medicine (population-based medicine, or the treatment of “norm”) grows 
through the greater understanding of optimal treatment choices for the 
majority of people, and later transitions to personalized medicine based on 
the treatment of individuals according to their unique genetic profiles, this 
currently high degree of scientific uncertainly will steadily diminish over the 
next several decades, reducing the use of this exception.  This proposed 
system also looks to the future of medicine as it allows for, and facilitates, 
the ultimate transition of the practice of medicine to the personalized 
medicine model. 
Updates on an ongoing basis to the set of CPGs must be done by the 
cardiology standing committee to keep pace with scientific developments.  
The practice norm for all of the cardiology practice group’s physicians 
should be to apply the CPGs adopted by the cardiology practice.  Data on the 
actual implementation of the CPGs should be gathered by the risk 
management department.  If a CPG was not followed, collecting information 
on the reasons why the CPG was not followed will allow for further 
modifications by the standing committee to fit the needs of the practice and 
its patients.  This fine-tuning will allow improved adherence to the CPG. 
The process described in this section relies on steps four through seven 
of knowledge translation theory.  A continuous assessment of the 
determinants of knowledge use (when the CPGs have been followed or not 
and why) will be made by risk management pursuant to step four.  If further 
education regarding the CPGs is needed, problem solving can be done and 
strategies for teaching can be created pursuant to step five.  Steps six 
through seven for translating knowledge into action are fulfilled through a 
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continuing assessment of the success in implementing the CPGs and their 
impact on healthcare quality and cost. 
c.  A Working Example of the Application of Knowledge Translation 
Theory 
A simple example of how this process can work is the practice of the 
prescription of aspirin after a heart attack.  Providing aspirin to a patient 
within twenty-four hours of a heart attack is well known to increase that 
patient’s chances of survival by 30%, and this increased survival rate is well 
supported by scientific evidence.314  In spite of this evidence, 50% of 
physicians fail to provide this simple, life-saving treatment.315  This proposal 
envisions that the CPG committees of all of the hospital cardiology 
departments across the country propose that their practice area adopt the 
CPG of the American College of Cardiology316 recommending this 
treatment.  Thus, this CPG would become an expectation of performance for 
the medical staff of the hospital’s cardiology department. 
If, in fact, a heart attack patient is admitted to the hospital with a 
condition that contradicts the provision of this treatment, the physician must 
document this fact as the reason why the CPG was not followed.  With this 
documentation, the failure to provide the treatment will not constitute a 
violation of the performance expectation as set forth in the adopted CPG.  
Rather, because the physician made a reasoned decision not to follow the 
CPG, the performance failure would be the failure to document this reason.  
This documentation exception should avoid a rigid expectation that the CPG 
be followed in all circumstances.  It recognizes that patient care does not 
always follow the norm and allows for flexibility to adjust to a patient’s 
unique needs.  Risk management would then follow-up with the physician to 
investigate why the CPG was not followed. 
This committee system allows for physician choice among CPGs,317 
 314.  UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERS., HOSPITALS COMPARE, 
available at http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/Hospital/Static/Data-Professionals.asp 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  The American College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association publish their 
guidelines for the management of patients with acute myocardial infarction (“MI,” more commonly 
known as “heart attack”); updates to the guidelines are published in the Journal of the American 
College of Cardiology.  Am. Coll. Cardiology & Am. Heart Assoc., 1999 Update: ACC/AHA 
Guidelines for the Management of Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction, 34 J. AM. COLL. 
CARDIOLOGY 890, available at http://content.onlinejacc.org/data/Journals/JAC/22905/03514.pdf.  
The American Heart Association also publishes jointly-authored guidelines in their journal 
Circulation: Journal of the American Heart Association.  Am. Coll. Cardiology & Am. Heart 
Assoc., 1999 Update: ACC/AHA Guidelines for the Management of Patients with Acute Myocardial 
Infarction, 100 CIRCULATION 1030, available at http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/100/9/ 
1016.full.pdf+html. 
 317.  Clinical Practice Guidelines are based on empirical data generated by clinical outcomes and 
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which act to suggest treatment choices based on best outcomes derived from 
empirical studies.318  Two models have already been implemented and 
demonstrate how this is already working: the integrated practice models 
adopted by the Mayo Clinic319 and the VA Hospital System.320 
 
C.  Adopting the Third-Party Error Reporting System Used by the Airline 
Industry 
While there are systems in place that require hospitals to report medical 
errors to regulatory agencies, there is no system in place that encourages 
physicians, nurses, and other hospital employees to report medial errors or 
near misses.  As discussed earlier, underreporting is a serious hurdle that 
must be overcome before the problem of medical error can be remedied.  
Health care administrators and policymakers need accurate data on error 
types and frequency in order to diagnose their root causes.321  Recognizing 
the cause of the errors allows system reforms to be developed and 
implemented.322 
The culture of blame—and the fear of sanctions it triggers—creates an 
environment of secrecy surrounding medical errors.323  The creation of an 
error reporting system that short-circuits this blame game is a prerequisite to 
understanding why errors really happen and how they can be prevented.  
Members of the quality improvement movement have long advocated the 
adoption of the system for error reporting created by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA).  This system relies on anonymous mechanisms for error reporting, 
which encourages voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive reporting for 
effectiveness research that suggests the optimum treatment for a rapidly growing number of clinical 
conditions.  See Leahy, supra note 162, at 1506. 
 318.  See id.  This use of empirical data generated through scientific methodology to make 
medical decisions shows great promise for enhancing quality of care while decreasing the cost of 
care.  See Van Tassel, Due Process, supra note 3, at 1241–55. 
 319.  See Douglas McCarthy et al., Mayo Clinic: Multidisciplinary Teamwork, Physician-Led 
Governance, and Patient-Centered Culture Drive World-Class Health Care, 27 COMMONWEALTH 
FUND PUB., Aug. 2009, at 13–14, available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2009/Aug/1306_Mc
Carthy_Mayo_case%20study.pdf (describing the structural and cultural pillars undergirding the 
Mayo Clinic’s integrated model of health care delivery). 
 320.  See Van Tassel, Harmonizing, supra note 12. 
 321.  See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 323.  See supra Part III. 
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pilots,324 aviation mechanics,325 and air traffic controllers,326 as well as other 
aviation professionals.  Importantly, the FAA “has also chosen to waive 
fines and penalties, subject to certain limitations, for unintentional violations 
of federal aviation statutes and regulations which are reported to ASRS 
[Aviation Safety Reporting System].”327 
Adopting a similar system for reporting medical errors or near misses in 
hospitals will allow hospital risk management teams access to data essential 
to identifying error types and frequency in order to diagnose their root 
causes so that system reforms can be developed and implemented.328  The 
seven-step translation of knowledge theory described above should be used 
in educating physicians and other medical personnel in the use of these 
systems.329 
D.  Allowing a “Comparative Negligence” Type of Defense in Physician 
Peer Review in Order to Encourage Continuous Quality Improvement 
Element 
In addition to continuously gathering information on why some best 
practices are adopted and some are not, the hospital’s risk management 
department must continuously institute new error avoidance processes, and 
adapt those hospital processes to optimize uptake of error avoidance systems 
based on this data.  Adding to this responsibility, risk management should be 
tasked with using the data generated by the anonymous third-party medical 
error reporting system described above. 
Another failure of the hospital peer review hearing process is its refusal 
to acknowledge that it is the hospital, not the physician, which has the power 
to use this data to institute new, system-wide processes for avoiding errors.  
Thus, the hospital is in the best position to avoid medical errors at the least 
cost—otherwise known as the “best cost avoider.”330 
 324.  See generally AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 325.  See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAINTENANCE ASAP PROGRAMS 
(2009), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/asap/reports_presentations/media/Maintenance_ASAP_DOT-
FAA-AR-9-28.pdf. 
 326.  See Alan Levine, FAA Error-Reporting Program Reveals Hazards, Yields Fixes, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 5, 2010, 9:38 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-04-faa-error-
reports_N.htm. 
 327.  Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., available at 
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiality.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 328.  See id. 
 329.  See supra Part VI.B.1. 
 330.  Katharine Van Tassel, The Introduction of Biotech Foods to the Tort System: Creating a 
New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1645, 1688–89 (2004) [hereinafter Van Tassel, Biotech].  
In this article, I explain the enterprise liability doctrine as follows: 
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 “[I]mproving safety for patients require[s] a systems approach in 
order to modify the conditions that contribute to errors.”  After 
reviewing the successful systems-based safety improvements in the 
airline industry and in workplace safety, the IOM noted, 
“[A]ccidents can be prevented through good organizational design 
and management.”331 
Enterprise liability theory counsels that the hospital peer review system, 
like the personal injury recovery system, should place the cost of injuries on 
the best cost avoider since they are in the best position to take steps to avoid 
the injury.332  This theory explains that one of the goals of the hospital peer 
review system should be to act instrumentally to encourage the best cost 
avoider to institute safety measures to avoid liability for future errors.333  The 
Institute of Medicine points out that “although some of these cases [of 
 The prime objective of the tort system is to compensate innocent victims harmed by 
faulty conduct.  However, shifting the cost of these injuries onto the wrongdoers is 
arguably instrumental in achieving many other equally laudatory objectives.  Forcing a 
manufacturer to bear the costs of injuries incurred from its products that are faulty in their 
manufacture or design may deter future misconduct and may tacitly encourage more 
careful behavior, such as increasingly diligent testing and product design.  The cost of 
injuries from the use of a product may also then be built into the price of the product and 
passed on to the consumer.  If these effects are realized, several goals that commonly fall 
under the rubric of “enterprise liability” may be accomplished.  First, the cost of the risk 
will be borne by society generally, instead of the innocent victim alone.  Second, the 
price of the product will reflect its true social cost.  This price will then mediate 
consumer choice, resulting in optimum levels of production and purchase.  As the price 
of the product increases as a result of internalizing the cost of injuries, the consumption 
of the product will decline as consumers switch to less costly alternatives, resulting, 
ultimately, in a decrease in injuries due to the use of the product.  Thus, through 
enterprise liability, the tort system arguably insulates against the overuse and 
overconsumption of relatively risky products.  Moreover, enterprise liability may place 
the cost of injury avoidance on the least-cost accident avoider.  The manufacturer is often 
in the best position to accurately access the various ways of avoiding costs of injuries 
through redesign, quality control, and other safety measures.  As a result of its level of 
access, the manufacturer is also often in the best position to insure against future injuries.  
Internalizing all of these costs, as well as the costs associated with injuries, into the price 
of the product may ultimately force a manufacturer to consider the true cost of certain 
products when making its choices of which products to produce.  It is hoped that the end 
result of enterprise liability is a socially efficient output. 
 Finally, placing the cost of the injury from the product onto the manufacturer that reaps 
the profits from the sales of the product is morally the right and fair outcome. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 331.  A National Survey of Medical Error Reporting Laws, supra note 131, at 203 (citation 
omitted). 
 332.  See Van Tassel, Biotech, supra note 330. 
 333.  See id. 
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preventable adverse events] may stem from incompetent or impaired 
providers, the committee believes that many could likely have been avoided 
had better systems of care been in place.”334  Thus, hospitals are in the best 
position to prevent medical errors. 
Under the enterprise liability theory, it should be recognized that a 
hospital owes a duty of care to its physicians to create a safe practice 
environment that optimizes error avoidance.  This is similar to the duty of 
care that factories owe their workers to provide a safe work environment.  
To properly recognize who is in the best position to avoid the risks of many 
errors, the physician should be able to assert a form of the defense of 
comparative negligence by the hospital in a hospital peer review action.  In 
order to make out this defense, the physician must establish that: (1) the 
hospital could have implemented a feasible error avoidance system, (2) the 
hospital failed to implement this system, and (3) the error would not have 
happened if the system had been in place.335  This also allows for a proper 
apportionment of fault based upon who is in the best position to avoid the 
risk of error according to the extensive body of research on the systems 
approach to error avoidance. 
Just as in the case of the airline pilot who has committed an error who is 
not punished if that pilot has self-reported, if the physician is successful in 
this defense, in addition to having reported to the anonymous third party 
reporting system, any sanction should be limited to error avoidance training, 
and this sanction should not be reported to the NPDB.  The self-report 
should also be barred from being used as evidence in the hospital peer 
review process to ensure that the physician’s self-report cannot be used 
against that physician.  These protections provide strong incentives to the 
physician to self-report their errors.  
Importantly, just as with the airline error reporting system, the physician 
will not be entitled to this defense if the physician has engaged in reckless or 
intentional conduct.  This preserves the appropriate level of physician 
accountability.336  Creating this exemption to the reporting requirement will 
require an amendment to HCQIA. 
Allowing this defense in hospital peer review will encourage hospitals 
to buy into the anonymous third party error reporting system described 
above.  In addition, it will encourage hospitals to use the data generated by 
this error reporting system in their continuous quality improvement 
 334.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 30. 
 335.  This is similar in many respects to a product liability cause of action.  See Van Tassel, 
Biotech, supra note 330. 
 336.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. WACHTER, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT SAFETY 349–53 (2d ed. 2012) 
(proposing a model for balancing “no blame” and accountability by looking at degrees of fault as 
well as alluding to the idea of collective responsibility that includes the physician, the healthcare 
team and, importantly, the hospital). 
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processes in accord with the weight of the evidence on what works to 
prevent medical errors. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the astonishing number of patients killed in hospitals each 
year and the soaring costs of healthcare, it is time to begin a critical review 
of the hospital peer review hearing system.  This Article starts the dialogue 
by pointing out some of the more obvious problems with this system, 
including: the “bad apples” approach, the choice of standards that the 
hospital peer review hearing system relies upon to measure physician 
competence, and the possible negative impact that the hospital peer review 
hearing system has on access to healthcare—particularly the potential 
negative impact on minority physicians as well as minority and low-income 
patients.337  All of these problems negatively impact overall healthcare 
quality, cost, and access. 
In order to deal with these problems, this Article proposes that hospital 
peer review be completely restructured to comport with the current scientific 
understanding of the methodologies that best act to prevent medical errors.338  
A new system that relies upon the application of knowledge translation 
theory—along with continuous quality improvement—to integrate evidence-
based treatment choices using clinical practice guidelines into physician 
practice should be developed.  Relying on the libertarian paternalism theory 
developed by Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, this proposed 
system relies upon “gold standard” clinical practice guidelines as the default 
treatment choice, but then allows for individual physician choice in 
deviating from this default choice if it is reasonable to do so.  This exception 
allows for the currently high level of scientific uncertainty that exists when it 
comes to many medical conditions, particularly in the realm of the treatment 
of outliers.  As the practice of evidence-based medicine (population-based 
medicine, or the treatment of “norm”) grows through the greater 
understanding of optimal treatment choices for the majority of people, and 
later transitions to personalized medicine based on the treatment of 
individuals according to their unique genetic profiles, this currently high 
degree of scientific uncertainly will steadily diminish over the next several 
decades, reducing the use of this exception.  This proposed system also 
looks to the future of medicine as it allows for, and facilitates, the ultimate 
 337.  See supra Parts III–V. 
 338.  See supra Part VI. 
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transition of the practice of medicine to the personalized medicine model.  In 
order to optimize this systems approach to error prevention, this Article 
proposes that this new system be coupled with the adoption of a version of 
the anonymous third-party error reporting system successfully utilized by the 
airline industry and long-advocated by the healthcare quality improvement 
movement.  Finally, this proposal recognizes that the hospital is both the 
best and least cost avoider when it comes to medical errors by allowing 
physicians to use a form of the comparative negligence defense during the 
peer review hearing process, that, coupled with reporting to an anonymous 
third-party error reporting system, acts to conditionally insulate the 
physician from NPDB reporting. 
 
